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ABSTRACT 
  
 A number of branches of the literature on internal labor markets have matured to the 
point that there is now a healthy two-way interaction between theory and empirical work.  In this 
survey I consider two of these branches: i) wage and promotion dynamics; and ii) human-
resource practices.  For each case I describe the empirical and theoretical literatures and also 
discuss what we can learn by paying careful attention to how theoretical and empirical findings 
are related.  In addition to surveying the literatures on these two topics, my goal is to show how a 
deeper understanding of internal-labor-market phenomena can be derived from a close partnering 
of empirical and theoretical research. 
 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 During the last 30 years economics has made great progress in moving beyond treating 
the firm as a “black box” and understanding various aspects of its internal operation.  One area, 
in particular, where substantial progress has been made is that of internal labor markets.1  In this 
paper I do not broadly survey the now extensive literature on this topic (see Gibbons (1997), 
Lazear (1999), Gibbons and Waldman (1999a), and Lazear and Oyer (2007) for broad-based 
surveys), but rather focus on connections between theory and evidence in this literature.  In 
particular, pursuing a theme first explored in Gibbons and Waldman (1999a), I explore the extent 
to which patterns of empirical evidence can be used to choose between competing theories. 
 Most of the early literature on internal labor markets was theoretical and these papers 
typically fall under one of two main approaches.  One approach was to identify and model a 
fundamental factor concerning the operation of internal labor markets.  Some of the important 
contributions that fall in this category include Becker (1962,1964) on human capital, Holmstrom 
(1979,1982) and Shavell (1979) on agency theory, and Rosen (1982) on the allocation of 
workers across an employment hierarchy.  Clearly these are important contributions that 
established some of the main building blocks that later theoretical contributions rely upon.  But 
mostly these papers were not focused on the empirical literature and, in particular, the extent to 
which the models developed are able to capture important empirical relationships. 
 The second approach was more closely tied to the empirical evidence in that the focus 
was typically providing an explanation for an important empirical phenomenon.  Important 
papers here include Lazear’s (1979) model of mandatory retirement, Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) 
seminal model of labor-market tournaments that provides an explanation for why promotions are 
typically associated with large wage increases, and Waldman (1984a) which explores the 
                                                     
1 Doeringer and Piore (1971) originally utilized the term “internal labor market” to refer to the human-resource 
practices of a firm (or part of a firm) that employs ports of entry, promotion from within, wages attached to jobs, 
and job ladders.  Their analysis focused mostly on blue-collar settings and was mostly descriptive rather than based 
on statistical analysis.  Consistent with more recent literature, I use the term to refer to various issues concerning a 
firm’s labor force when the labor force exhibits long-term attachments to the firm.  With this usage the term can be 
used to describe either blue- or white-collar settings.  Alternative terminology would be to refer to “personnel 
economics” or “careers in organizations” rather than “internal labor markets.” 
2 
signaling role of promotions and provides a competing explanation for large wage increases 
upon  promotion.  In addition to these papers providing explanations for important real-world 
phenomena, these papers have also served as important building blocks. 
 But as the literature has matured, two related questions have become central.  First, when 
there are competing plausible theories for an empirical phenomenon, which one best captures the 
correct real-world explanation for the phenomenon.  For example, both tournament theory and 
promotions serving as signals provide plausible explanations for why promotions are typically 
associated with large wage increases.  How should we choose between these competing theories, 
or possibly, what would lead us to conclude that both are at work?  Second, empirical 
phenomena should not be viewed in isolation.  If, for example, tournament theory is the correct 
explanation for large wage increases at promotion, then this has implications for the correct 
explanation for other internal-labor-market phenomena.  In other words, many of these 
phenomena are inherently intertwined, so there should be a single model or a set of related 
models that explain related phenomena rather than a completely different model for each fact. 
 Much of the more recent literature makes progress on these issues in one of two ways.  
First, on the empirical side, rather than focusing on a single empirical fact or phenomenon, many 
papers focus on presenting a pattern of evidence concerning related issues.  Early papers I would 
place in this category are Medoff and Abraham’s (1980,1981) papers concerning the relationship 
between performance evaluations and wages.  More recent important papers in this category 
include Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom’s (1994a,b) papers on wage and promotion dynamics and 
Ichniowki, Shaw, and Prennushi’s (1997) investigation of human-resource practices.   
 Second, a number of more recent theoretical studies focus on whether the theoretical 
model is consistent with patterns in the empirical evidence rather than a single fact or empirical 
phenomenon.  Examples of papers that take this approach are Milgrom and Roberts (1990), 
Bernhardt (1995), and Gibbons and Waldman (1999b,2006).  Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
shows how complementarity across work practices can explain various standard findings in the 
empirical literature concerning innovative work practices, while Bernhardt (1995) and Gibbons 
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and Waldman (1999b,2006) provide models that explain various findings in the empirical 
literarture concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms.   
 This survey focuses on this agenda.  That is, it focuses on how we can use patterns of 
evidence concerning various internal-labor-market issues to choose between plausible alternative 
theoretical approaches, where not surprisingly sometimes the evidence points towards a 
combination of theories being the right answer.  I also try to highlight what are the open 
questions.  Also, given the focus of the paper, rather than choosing to do a comprehensive 
survey, I consider specific topics within the broad literature on internal labor markets for which 
the literature is sufficiently mature that focusing on patterns of evidence and theories that can 
address these patterns is a worthwhile exercise. 
 The two specific topics I consider are wage and promotion dynamics and human-resource 
practices.  Sections II and III consider the literature on wage and promotion dynamics.  Section 
II surveys empirical evidence including basic empirical findings, the role of schooling, and the 
role of performance evaluations.  Section III then discusses four candidate models for explaining 
the evidence and also provides an overview and synthesis.  Sections IV and V consider the 
literature on human-resource practices.  Section IV surveys the evidence focusing on the nature 
of the various types of evidence, and then more specifically the evidence concerning the effects 
of adoption and patterns of adoption of innovative-human-resource practices.  Section V then 
discusses relevant theories.  Section VI considers international differences in internal-labor-
market operation, where most of these differences are closely linked to differences in human-
resource practices.  Here most of the focus is on US-Japanese differences and the various 
theoretical models that have been put forth to explain those differences.  Section VII concludes. 
 
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON WAGE AND PROMOTION DYNAMICS 
 This section starts with a discussion of basic empirical findings and then follows with 
discussions of the role of schooling and of performance evaluations.  Some of the evidence 
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concerning wage and promotion dynamics are found in tests of specific theoretical models.  
Much of this evidence is discussed in Section III which focuses on theory. 
 
A) Basic Empirical Findings
 Although most of the findings in this subsection appear in Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom’s 
(1994a,b) in-depth empirical analysis of a single firm’s wage and promotion practices based on 
personnel records, most of the focus is on findings with support both there and elsewhere.  Other 
important papers in this literature include Lazear (1992), McLaughlin (1994), McCue (1996), 
and Podolny and Baron (1997).  Note that some of these studies are similar to Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom’s study in that the focus is on a data set drawn from a single firm’s personnel 
records, while others analyze data drawn from broader cross-sections.  Also, like Baker, Gibbs, 
and Holmstrom, a number of the studies focus on the internal-labor-market careers of white-
collar workers while others consider both blue- and white-collar workers.  For each finding I 
provide a list of of papers that find supporting evidence (and where appropriate papers that find 
contradictory evidence), but because of the rapid growth in this literature in recent years I do not 
attempt to make an exhaustive list for each finding. 
 The first finding is that real-wage decreases are not rare, but nominal-wage decreases and 
demotions are.  That real-wage decreases are not rare has been found in a number of studies 
including Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b), McLaughlin (1994), and Card and Hyslop 
(1997).  Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom find that the frequenciy of real-wage decreases is higher 
in high-inflation environments which suggest some type of lag in the wage-adjustment process, 
but some real-wage decreases are seen even when inflation is low.  The same papers find 
evidence of a low rate of nominal wage decreases.  On the other hand, although less well 
documented outside of the Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom study, I take it as uncontroversial that 
demotions are typically rare.  Although Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann (2004) focus on a 
declining firm – Fokker Aircraft – and find that demotions can be substantial during a decline. 
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 A second finding with significant empirical support is serial correlation in promotion 
rates, i.e., a worker promoted quickly from say level one to level two will on average earn 
promotion to level three more quickly.  This is sometimes referred to as a fast track.  Support for 
this can be found in Rosenbaum (1984), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b), and Podolny 
and Baron (1997).  In an interesting recent paper Belzil and Bognanno (2004) use a structural-
estimation approach to investigate the more detailed question of what drives fast tracks.  They 
find that conditional on unobservables, a worker’s promotion probability is only slightly higher 
when the worker was promoted more quickly in the past, where the magnitude of this effect  is 
larger for workers with lower levels of education.   
 A third finding where the evidence is a bit more mixed is that of serial correlation in 
wage increases.  There is strong evidence for this finding in papers focused on relatively 
homogeneous samples such as Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom’s analysis of the managerial 
workforce of a single firm, the Lillard and Weiss (1979) study of American scientists, and 
Hause’s (1980) study of young Swedish males.  A number of studies such as Abowd and Card 
(1989), Topel (1991), and Topel and Ward (1992) do not find evidence of serial correlation in 
wage increases looking at heterogenous samples such as the PSID.  One exception is Baker 
(1997) who finds serial correlation in wage increases using the PSID, but he considers a larger 
panel than other studies and also uses alternative econometric tests. 
 Another finding with strong support is that promotions are associated with large wage 
increases.  This has been found in numerous studies including Lazear (1992), Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994a,b), and McCue (1996).  A little surprising given the strong evidence for this 
finding is that there is also strong evidence for wage increases at promotion being small relative 
to the differences between average wages across adjacent job levels.  This has been found in 
papers such as Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b), Murphy (1985), and Main, O’Reilly, 
and Wade (1993).  Although at first these two findings may seem contradictory, as will be 
discussed in more detail later, they are actually easy to reconcile given that on average wage 
changes are positive in periods where no promotions occur. 
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 The last two findings have less support in the literature, but this is possibly because there  
has been less study of these issues.  The first is that large wage increases early at a job level 
predict subsequent promotions.  This is found in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b) and  
evidence along this line is also found in McCue (1996).  The last finding is that wages exhibit 
cohort effects, i.e., a cohort’s wage as it ages depends to an extent on the average starting wage 
even after controlling for composition differences across cohorts.  This is found in Baker, Gibbs, 
and Holmstrom (1994a,b) and, more recently, in Kahn (2006), Oyer (2006), and Oreopoulos, von 
Wachter, and Heisz (2006) which look at economy-wide cohort wages or industry-level cohort 
wages.  Also, although their specific findings are a bit different, related findings that cohorts 
matter appear in Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) which is discussed in more detail later. 
 
B) The Role of Schooling
 This subsection discusses empirical findings that specifically relate to the role of 
schooling in wage and promotion dynamics.  The first result which I take as noncontroversial so 
I do not list papers that find the result is that schooling positively affects the starting wage.  
Certainly, if this were not the case, many of us would likely be unemployed since the demand for 
undergraduate and graduate teaching would be significantly reduced. 
 A second finding is that schooling is positively related to promotion probabilities.  
Supporting evidence for this can be found in Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b), McCue 
(1996), and Lluis (2005), although McCue’s study which focuses on the PSID finds a 
statistically significant relationship only for white men; for other demographic groups the 
coefficients are typically positive but statistically insignificant.  Lluis (2005) also shows a related 
finding.  As will be discussed in the next section, one possible explanation for why schooling is 
positively related to promotion probabilities is that schooling is positively related to worker 
ability and worker ability is positively related to promotion probabilities.  This suggests that if 
one were to control for worker ability, then the positive relationship between schooling and 
promotion probability should weaken.  Lluis finds such a result.  Specifically, when she includes 
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a lagged value of each worker’s wage growth, which should be a noisy measure of ability, the 
result is that  
the positive relationship between schooling and promotion probabilities becomes weaker. 
 Another finding with strong support is that schooling is positively related to the wage 
even after controlling for experience and job assignment.  This is found both by Medoff and 
Abraham (1980,1981) and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b).  In each case the authors run 
Mincerian regressions that include job level and find that schooling is positively related to the 
wage even after controlling for experience and job level. 
 The final finding which concerns evidence between schooling and the returns to 
experience is mixed.  Farber and Gibbons (1996) using data from the NLSY regresses the wage 
level on various variables including schooling, experience and experience squared, a test score 
unobserved by employers, and various interaction terms including one between schooling and 
experience.  When they include controls for changes in the return to education over time they 
find that extra schooling does not change the return to experience.2  In contrast, Rubinstein and 
Weiss (2007) using three data sets – the CPS short panel, the PSID, and the NLSY – directly 
consider how earnings growth over various career intervals is related to schooling and find 
strong evidence that schooling is positively related to the return to experience.  Also, in a  recent 
paper using the CPS Habermalz (2006) allows for non-linearities and finds results consistent 
with schooling being positively related to the return to experience.3
 
C) The Role of Performance Evaluations
                                                     
2 An alternative approach is to use a log-wage specification explored in a large literature starting with Mincer 
(1974) (see Willis (1986) and Card (1999) for surveys).  A standard finding in this literature is that the log wage is 
positively related to schooling which suggests that the absolute return to experience increases with schooling.  But 
in his original study Mincer also adds an experience-schooling interaction and finds a significant negative 
coefficient.  This findings throws some doubt on whether the return to experience is truly increasing with the 
education level. 
3 Gibbons and Waldman (2006) argue that the findings of Farber and Gibbons that the return to experience is not 
increasing with education may be due to the limited time period studied and that a longer sample might produce a 
positive relationship as found in these other studies. 
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 The final set of facts I consider concerns the role of performance evaluations.  Not that 
many papers have considered this topic so most of the results are taken from Medoff and 
Abraham’s (1980,1981) classic studies.  Most of the focus of the Medoff and Abraham studies 
was on a discrepancy between the manner in which wages depend on labor-market experience 
and firm tenure and the manner in which performance evaluations depend on labor-market 
experience and firm tenure.  Specifically, they find that within a job wages are strongly 
positively related to labor-market experience and firm tenure, while performance evaluations are 
either unrelated or slightly negatively related to experience and firm tenure.  In interpreting their 
results they question the idea that much of wage growth during careers is the result of 
accumulation of human capital, but as I discuss later there are other possibilities. 
 A second related finding is that the magnitude of the negative relationship between 
performance evaluations and labor-market experience depends on the specific manner in which 
the test is conducted.  In particular, the negative relationship between performance evaluations 
and labor-market experience is larger in absolute value in cross-sectional analyses than 
longitudinal analyses on the same data set.  This is found in Medoff and Abraham’s work and in 
Gibbs (1995).  As discussed in more detail later, this finding suggests that at least some of the 
negative relationship found in cross-sectional analyses is due to the sorting of workers across 
jobs and firms over time due to promotions and exits as workers age. 
 Another set of findings is that high performance evalutions today predict good outcomes 
in the future.  Specifically, both Medoff and Abraham (1980,1981) and DeVaro and Waldman 
(2006) find that performance evaluations are positively related to future promotions and the size 
of future wage increases.  As will be discussed in more detail later, DeVaro and Waldman 
consider how a worker’s schooling level affects the relationship between performance 
evaluations and promotion probabilities.  They find results consistent with the idea that the 
performance required to achieve a promotion falls with the worker’s education level.     
 
III. FOUR CANDIDATE MODELS 
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 In this section I discuss four theoretical approaches that can be used to address or at least 
partially address the empirical facts presented in the previous section.  These are: i) symmetric 
learning and insurance; ii) the tournament approach; iii) pure asymmetric learning/promotions as 
signals; and iv) symmetric learning with human capital acquisition and job assignment.  At the 
end of the section I provide an overview and synthesis.4
 
A) Symmetric Learning and Insurance 
 This subsection discusses Harris and Holmstrom’s (1982) model of symmetric learning  
and insurance.5  As is made clear below, this model does well at capturing various facts 
concerning wage dynamics but, because of a lack of a hierarchical structure, it does poorly in 
terms of capturing facts that relate to promotions. 
 
1) Basic Description 
 In Harris and Holmstrom’s model workers vary in terms of their abilities, but within a 
schooling group (or some other attribute easily observable at time of labor-market entry) they 
look observationally equivalent upon entering the labor market.  As time passes firms observe 
workers’ outputs and update their beliefs concerning workers’ abilities.  Because of a stochastic 
component in the production function this learning is gradual, while because output realizations 
are public all firms have the same belief concerning a worker’s expected ability in each period. 
 The other main aspect of the model concerns the contracting environment.  Because 
workers are risk averse and firms are risk neutral, firms would like to insure workers against 
uncertainty concerning how beliefs about worker ability evolve over time.  Harris and 
                                                     
4 There are other theoretical approaches one might consider.  These include the idea of delayed compensation as 
found, for example, in Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979,1981), the efficiency wage argument as found, 
for example, in Calvo (1979,1985) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), the idea of influence costs as found, for 
example, in Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1988), and the idea of knowledge hierarchies as found, for 
example, in Garicano (2000), Garicano and Hubbard (2005), and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).  I focus on 
the four theoretical approaches that I believe are the strongest candidates for explaining the evidence. 
5 Harris and Holmstrom (1982) builds on the earlier work of Freeman (1977). 
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Holmstrom assume long-term contracting is feasible but also realistically that a worker cannot 
commit to not leave his or her current employer in order to accept a higher wage elsewhere.  
 Harris and Holmstrom show that equilibrium contracts consist of a downward rigid wage  
but there is a possibility that the wage will increase in the future depending on subsequent 
realizations of output.  The downward rigid wage provides partial insurance, where full 
insurance is not feasible because of the inability of workers to commit to not leave for a later 
higher wage elsewhere.  Further, at any point in time a worker’s wage equals the worker’s 
expected output minus an insurance premium the worker pays for the downward rigidity, where 
the size of this premium is negatively related to both worker age and the precision of beliefs 
concerning worker ability.  The insurance premium falls with age because the expected cost of 
offering a wage floor is lower when there are less future periods in which the wage floor might 
exceed subsequent values of expected worker productivity.  Similarly, it falls with the precision 
of beliefs about worker ability because the expected cost of a wage floor is lower when expected 
productivity is anticipated to vary little in subsequent periods. 
 
2) Theoretical Extensions and Empirical Tests 
 A related theoretical analysis appears in Weiss (1984).  In that analysis workers do not 
vary in terms of their underlying innate ability when they enter the labor market.  Rather, 
realized productivity in any period is stochastic and expected productivity grows stochastically 
as workers age where expected productivity in any period is a positive function of previous 
productivity.  In other words, high output now on average means higher outputs later.  As do 
Harris and Holmstrom, Weiss considers the role of insurance contracts.  Further, similar to 
Harris and Holmstron’s conclusions, Weiss finds that under specific assumptions concerning 
mobility costs and access to capital markets the result is a downward rigid wage where wage 
increases can occur if the stochastic process eventually results in sufficiently high expected 
productivity. 
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 There have been a few direct tests of the theory.  Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) first 
extend the theory to consider the importance of past labor-market conditions on current wages.  
They find that a worker’s current wage should be a positive function of the best labor-market 
conditions experienced since the worker was hired.  This prediction contrasts with the spot 
contracting prediction that only current labor-market conditions should matter.  They test the  
prediction using data from the CPS and the PSID and find supportive evidence.  More recently,  
Grant (2003) investigates the same prediction using the NLS and finds supportive evidence. 
 A different test is investigated in Chiappori, Salanie, and Valentin (1999).  They first 
extend Harris and Holmstrom’s model to show that in subsequent periods “late beginners” do 
better than “early starters.”  That is, holding fixed the wage at date t, the wage at t+1 should be 
negatively correlated with the wage at t-1, i.e., higher recent wage growth should on average 
translate into higher subsequent wage growth.  The authors then investigate this prediction using 
managerial data at a large French state-owned firm and find supportive evidence.  However, one 
drawback of this test, which is discussed by Chiappori, Salanie, and Valentin, is that there an 
alternative explanation.  The same prediction follows from a model in which wages equal 
expected productivity and changes in productivity growth are positively correlated over time. 
 
3) Pros and Cons 
 There are a number of positives concerning this theory.  First, it can explain the main  
Medoff and Abraham findings that wages on average rise with experience even though 
performance evaluations do not.  That is, assume the absence of performance evaluations 
increasing with labor-market experience means average productivity does not increase with 
labor-market experience.  Then the Harris and Holmstrom analysis exactly captures the Medoff 
and Abraham findings.  In their model expected productivity is independent of labor-market 
experience since there is no human-capital accumulation.  Yet, the average wage increases with 
labor-market experience because of the downward rigidity of wages and because, as discussed,  
the insurance premium falls with labor-market experience. 
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 Second, the model is consistent with a number of findings concerning earnings growth 
not discussed in the previous section but which are found in the literature on the subject.  For 
example, the model captures Mincer’s (1974) findings that within a schooling group the variance 
of earnings increases with labor-market experience and that within schooling-experience groups 
the distribution of wages tends to be positively skewed.  Third, as discussed above, a few papers  
have developed tests of the theory and those test have in general been supportive. 
 However, there are also significant negatives.  Probably the most important is that the 
evidence is not consistent with the model’s main prediction.  In the Harris and Holmstrom 
setting  firms insure workers against negative movements in beliefs concerning expected ability 
so wages are downward rigid, where the prediction is real-wage rigidity not nominal rigidity.  
But substantial evidence discussed in the previous section shows that the proportion of real-wage 
decreases is substantial.  The other main problem with the model is that, because of its lack of a 
hierarchical structure or at least alternative job assignments, the model does not address the 
various empirical findings concerning promotions discussed in the previous section. 
 
B) The Tournament Approach
 Here I discuss the tournament approach to internal-labor-market compensation.  This  
literature began with the seminal analysis of Lazear and Rosen (1981).  Most of the discussion 
focuses on the Lazear and Rosen analysis, although I do discuss a few of the many extensions of 
that analysis.  As is also discussed, there is clear empirical support for the main ideas underlying 
the tournament argument, but in general theoretical investigations have not explored the extent to 
which the theory can explain the large number of empirical findings concerning wage and 
promotion dynamics discussed above. 
 
1) Basic Description  
 Lazear and Rosen (1981) consider a setting characterized  by two risk-neutral identical  
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workers, where worker output is a function of effort and a stochastic term.  In their world effort 
is not directly observable so a firm cannot base compensation on the effort choices of its 
workers.  Instead the firm establishes a tournament.  It commits to prizes for the winner and the 
loser, where the winner is the worker who produces more and the two prizes are independent of 
the difference between the outputs and the absolute levels of the outputs. 
 Lazear and Rosen show that the difference between the prizes, i.e., the spread, serves as  
an incentive for effort, where the larger the spread the higher is the equilibrium effort level.  In 
turn, the equilibrium spread is the one that generates efficient effort levels.  That is, because 
effort is costly for workers too much effort is not desirable, so the firm chooses a spread that 
equates the marginal disutility of effort with the extra productivity associated with effort.  Lazear 
and Rosen interpret their results as providing an explanation for the large compensation 
increases associated with promotions.  In this interpretation promotions and the associated higher 
compensation serve as prizes and lower level workers increase their effort levels because doing 
so increases the probability of receiving the prizes. 
 Lazear and Rosen also discuss and analyze the circumstances in which labor-market 
tournaments are preferable to alternative ways to motivate workers when effort is not directly 
observable.  In the risk-neutral world that they begin with they show that tournaments and piece 
rates both yield first-best outcomes.  They then argue that because the information requirements 
for conducting tournaments are less than for paying piece rates – the tournament only requires an 
ordinal ranking of the workers – tournaments may be preferred because they are less costly to 
conduct.  Lazear and Rosen also consider what happens when workers are risk averse and argue 
that in some circumstances tournaments will be preferred to piece rates given risk aversion.  I 
come back to this issue below. 
 
2) Theoretical Extensions and Empirical Tests 
 There is a large literature extending Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) analysis.  A number of 
papers such as Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) focus on a comparison 
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between the efficiency or profitability of employing tournaments versus contracting directly on 
output.  As was true of Lazear and Rosen’s analysis of risk aversion, Green and Stokey’s 
analysis and Nalebuff and Stiglitz’s analysis do not focus on optimal contracts.  Mookherjee 
(1984), on the other hand, shows that under risk aversion the optimal contract typically 
dominates the optimal tournament.  This again raises the question of why tournaments are 
employed.  In addition to Lazear and Rosen’s answer to this question which concerns savings on 
information costs, Malcomson (1984) argues that tournaments may be employed because 
individual performance is not verifiable which makes individual contracting difficult to enforce.  
 Another important direction in which tournament theory has been extended concerns 
modeling a tournament that consists of several rounds or contests.  Clearly, real-world promotion 
tournaments do not consist of a single competition for promotion, but rather over a worker’s 
career promotion to a higher level job is soon followed by competition for a subsequent 
promotion.  Rosen (1986) models a tournament along this line (see also Meyer (1992)).  In 
Rosen’s model pairs of workers compete against each other in a round and then the winners 
proceed to the next round where there is again competition amongst pairs of workers.  The 
tournament ends when only a single winner remains.  Under the strong assumption that worker 
effort is constant across rounds, Rosen shows that the wage increase associated with winning the 
last round of the tournament is larger than the increases associated with winning earlier rounds.  
The paper thus provides a potential explanation for why wage increases associated with being 
promoted to the very top levels of firms seems to be especially large as found, for example, in 
Murphy (1985) and Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b). 
 There is also a substantial literature focused on testing implications of the tournament 
model.  One set of papers focuses on the prediction that worker effort should be positively 
related to the spread.  Various papers, including Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b) who study 
professional golf tournaments, Becker and Huselid (1992) who study auto racing, and Audas, 
Barmby, and Treble (2004) who study promotion at a large British financial sector employer, 
find evidence consistent with this prediction.  Although of interest, I find this particular set of 
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findings weak in terms of how strongly they support traditional tournament theory.  Independent 
of whether firms design promotion practices with incentives in mind as in classic tournament 
theory, utility maximization should result in higher worker effort when the spread is larger.   
 A second set of papers focus on predictions concerning firm behavior.  These predictions 
arise from extensions of the basic Lazear and Rosen model.  The first prediction is that the 
spread or wage increase due to promotion should be positively related to the number of workers 
at the job level from which the promoted worker is drawn.  The basic logic of this prediction is 
that increasing the number of workers competing for a promotion reduces equilibrium effort 
levels and the firm increases the spread as a response.6  Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993), 
Eriksson (1999), and Bognanno (2001) find supporting evidence, while O’Reilly, Main, and 
Crystal (1988) find contradictory evidence. 
 A second firm-side prediction is the convexity of the wage structure derived in Rosen’s 
(1986) analysis discussed above.  Support for this prediction is found in Lambert, Larcker, and 
Weigelt (1993) and Eriksson (1999).  Note that I find the general support for these two firm-side 
predictions more persuasive than the support for the worker effort prediction discussed above.  
The two firm-side predictions are more closely tied to the theoretical approach, so generally 
supportive empirical evidence is more persuasive.  But even here there is a potential alternative 
explanation for the first of these predictions.  That is, as discussed later, the idea that the wage 
increase due to promotion is potentially related to the number of workers at the job from which 
the promoted worker is drawn could be explained using the promotion-as-signal hypothesis.7  
                                                     
6 See Prendergast (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the logic of this prediction. 
7 Recently, Oyer (2007) tests a third firm-side prediction.  A number of extensions of the basic tournament model 
predict that in a tournament-type setting firms will favor insiders versus outsiders in deciding upon promotions (see 
Malcomson (1984), Chan (1996), and Waldman (2003)).  Oyer tests this prediction by looking at tenure decisions in 
economics departments.  He finds results consistent with the prediction.  Specifically, outside of the world’s top-ten 
departments, those hired into tenured positions from the outside are more productive on average than those 
promoted from within.  Note, however that this finding could also be explained by asymmetric learning as in 
Greenwald (1979,1986) and by the importance of influence activities as in Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1988). 
16 
 In a recent analysis, DeVaro (2006a,2006b) uses a structural-estimation approach to 
consider simultaneously both worker-effort and firm-side predictions of tournament theory.  
DeVaro looks at a sample of skilled workers taken from a cross-section of establishments in four 
metropolitan areas.  Using a structural-estimation approach that treats promotions, wage spreads, 
and performance as endogenous variables, he finds support for both types of predictions.  
Specifically, he finds results consistent with firms choosing spreads optimally and workers 
providing more effort when spreads are larger. 
   
3) Pros and Cons 
 There are clearly some strong positives associated with tournament theory.  Probably the 
most important is the basic plausibility of the argument.  Clearly, the possibility of promotion 
does serve as an important incentive for worker effort in real-world firms and it would be 
surprising if in thinking about promotion practices firms did not consider the ramifications for 
worker effort.  Further, the approach provides a very plausible explanation for a well 
documented internal-labor-market finding.  That is, a quite plausible explanation for large wage 
increases at promotion is that the large wage increases are used to provide incentives for effort. 
 The other main positive is that, as discussed in some detail above, most studies that have 
tested implications of the tournament approach have found supportive evidence.  As discussed, 
there is substantial evidence that as the tournament model predicts worker effort is positively 
related to the spread in the compensation between winning and losing.  Also, studies also 
generally find that compensation practices vary within and across firms in ways consistent with 
theoretical predictions.  Specifically, evidence supports the prediction that the spread is a 
positive function of the number of lower level employees and also that there should be a convex 
relationship between compensation and job level. 
 The main disadvantage of the tournament approach is that the theory has not been  
developed in ways that make clear the extent to which the approach is capable of capturing 
various internal-labor-market findings such as early wage increases at one job level predicting 
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subsequent promotions, wage increases upon promotion being small relative to wage differences 
across adjacent levels, and serial correlation in promotion rates.  But the fact such findings have 
not been addressed to date does not mean that some enriched tournament model is not capable of 
capturing these findings.  Another drawback is that there are certain aspects of standard 
tournament theory that seem unrealistic.  For example, the idea that firms commit to “prizes” that 
are independent of attributes and performance of the winner seems inconsistent with empirical 
evidence in papers such as Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,b) where the wage paid to a 
newly promoted worker seems to depend both on worker attributes and performance.  As 
discussed more below, possibly the answer is that there are labor-market tournaments but they 
take a somewhat different form than initially modeled by Lazear and Rosen. 
 
C) Asymmetric Learning/Promotions as Signals
 Another important approach for thinking about internal-labor-market wage and 
promotion  
dynamics is the idea that promotions serve as signals as first modeled in Waldman (1984a) and 
later extended in Bernhardt (1995).  This approach is capable of capturing a number of empirical 
findings in the internal-labor-market literature, but its inability to capture some of the key 
findings means that by itself it is unlikely to be the correct explanation for wage and promotion 
dynamics in internal labor markets. 
 
1) Basic Description 
 Waldman (1984a) puts forth the basic argument.  That paper considers a model 
characterized by asymmetric as opposed to symmetric learning.  When workers enter the labor 
market their ability levels are initially unknown and there is learning as in the symmetric 
learning case.  The difference is that only a worker’s current employer directly observes ability 
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while other firms learn about worker ability by observing the actions of the current employer.  In 
Waldman’s analysis the key such action is the promotion decision.8
 To be precise, Waldman considers a two-period setting in which workers vary in their 
innate ability levels but look identical when they enter the labor market.  Firms are characterized 
by two jobs – a low-level job where the return to ability is low and a high-level job where this 
return is high.  In the first period all workers are assigned to the low-level job and then at the end 
of the period a worker’s initial employer learns the worker’s innate ability level.  In the second 
period high-ability workers are then promoted to the high-level job, where one of the key results 
is that fewer workers are promoted than is socially efficient.  The logic is that a promotion serves 
as a signal that the worker’s ability is high, so after a worker is promoted other firms are willing 
to bid more for the worker’s services.  This means the current employer must pay a promoted 
worker more to stop the worker from being bid away, but this, in turn, causes firms to only 
promote workers when they are significantly more productive in the high-level job. 
 Bernhardt (1995) extends this analysis.  The main differences are that in Bernhardt’s  
model workers are in the labor market for more than two periods, there is a richer process of 
human-capital accumulation, and Bernhardt allows workers to vary in terms of their publicly- 
observed schooling levels.  What happens in Bernhardt’s model is that as a cohort ages workers 
are promoted in bunches, where the highest ability workers are promoted first and then the next 
highest, etc.  Further, as in Waldman’s analysis, because of signaling, promotions are associated 
with large wage increases while the frequency with which workers are promoted is inefficiently 
low because firms try to avoid the large wage increases associated with promotion. 
 In addition to showing that the main results found in Waldman (1984a) continue to hold 
in a richer model, Bernhardt also derives a number of new and interesting findings.  For 
example, Bernhardt finds that asymmetric learning results in firms favoring more highly 
educated workers in the promotion process.  That is, holding fixed a worker’s true productivity, 
                                                     
8 Greenwald (1979,1986) is another early analysis of asymmetric learning in labor markets, but his focus was on the 
turnover decision rather than the promotion decision. 
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workers with more education are promoted first. This arises because even in the absence of a 
promotion workers with more education are paid a higher wage, so the signaling role of 
promotion is smaller for these workers.  Bernhardt also shows how his model can explain serial 
correlation in promotion rates, i.e., promotion fast tracks. 
 
2) Theoretical Extensions and Related Empirical Tests 
 There have been a number of theoretical extensions of this framework and a more limited 
number of empirical tests.  I believe the most important of the theoretical extensions appears in 
Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001).9  That paper connects the promotion-as-signal idea to the idea of 
labor-market tournaments discussed earlier (see also Gibbs (1995) and Ghosh and Waldman 
(2006)).  In the traditional labor-market-tournament model the firm imposes the promotion 
tournament in order to create incentives for workers to provide effort.  In the Zabojnik and 
Bernhardt model the tournament instead arises endogenously from asymmetric information and 
the resulting signaling aspect of promotions.  That is, rather than committing to a prize 
associated with promotion, prizes arise endogenously due to the positive signal associated with 
promotion and the resulting large wage increases needed to stop promoted workers from being 
bid away.  In addition to showing how the labor-market-tournament approach and the 
promotion-as-signal approach can be reconciled, Zabojnik and Bernhardt show that their model 
can explain various findings in the firm-size-wage-effects literature and the interindustry-wage-
differences literature. 
 On the empirical side there have been a number of tests of whether asymmetric learning 
is important in labor markets, but only one that directly looks at the promotion-as-signal 
hypothesis.  The classic empirical test of asymmetric learning in labor markets is found in 
Gibbons and Katz (1991) which builds on Greenwald’s (1979,1986) classic analysis of adverse 
selection in labor-market turnover.  The Gibbons and Katz argument is that laid-off workers 
                                                     
9 Other theoretical papers that focus on the promotion-as-signal hypothesis include Ricart i Costa (1988), Waldman 
(1990), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993), and Owan (2004). 
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should be lower ability on average than those fired in a plant closing because adverse selection 
means laid off workers are drawn from the low end of the ability distribution while workers fired 
in a plant closing are drawn from the whole distribution.10  Based on this, they derive three 
testable implications: i) predisplacement wages should be uncorrelated with the cause of the 
displacement; ii) postdisplacement wages should be lower for laid-off workers than those fired in 
a plant closing; and iii) postdisplacement unemployment duration should be higher for laid-off 
workers than those fired in a plant closing.  Gibbons and Katz test these predictions using data 
from the CPS and find evidence that supports all three predictions. 
 Although the Gibbons and Katz empirical analysis and closely related analyses that have 
followed provide strong evidence that asymmetric learning is important in labor markets, it is 
only indirect evidence for the promotion-as-signal hypothesis.11  The only empirical analysis 
focused directly on the promotion-as-signal hypothesis is found in DeVaro and Waldman (2006) 
(see also Belzil and Bognanno (2004) for related results).  Related to a result in Bernhardt 
(1995), that paper first extends the theory to show that the signaling aspect of promotions should 
be larger for workers of lower schooling levels because, even before promotion, workers with 
higher schooling levels are already thought of as higher ability.  DeVaro and Waldman then 
show that this has implications for how wage increases due to promotions should vary with 
schooling and how the performance level required for promotion should vary with schooling.  
After deriving testable implications along this line they show supporting evidence using the 
same data set investigated in the Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,1994b) study discussed 
earlier.  They also consider various alternative explanations for their findings and argue that the 
promotion-as-signal hypothesis matches the evidence better than any of the alternatives.   
  
                                                     
10 To be precise, the Gibbons and Katz argument allows for both adverse selection as in Greenwald’s (1979,1986) 
analysis and for the possibility that layoffs serve as a signal like in the promotion-as-signal hypothesis. 
11 Doiron (1995) and Grund (1999) also find evidence consistent with the Gibbons and Katz predictions using data 
for Canada and Germany, respectively, while Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), which is discussed in more detail later, 
extends the Gibbons and Katz framework to consider incentives for firms to provide their workers with general 
human capital and then show supporting evidence using German data.  
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3) Pros and Cons 
 There are clearly some positives associated with the promotion-as-signal hypothesis.  The  
main one is the basic plausibility of the hypothesis.  Promotions are typically publicly observable 
events and workers, especially successful ones, provide their job-assignment history on their 
resume.  This is consistent with the history of job assignments serving as important pieces of 
information for prospective employers which is exactly the promotion-as-signal argument.  It is 
also plausible that large wage increases at promotion are due at least partly to signaling.  That is, 
if a worker’s job-assignment history is an important consideration for prospective employers, 
then it is plausible that when a worker’s current employer improves that history via a promotion 
the employer also increases the worker’s wage to stop the worker from being bid away. 
 The approach also has significant empirical support both in terms of various empirical  
studies and being able to explain some important findings in the empirical wage- and promotion-
dynamics literature.  First, Gibbons and Katz (1991) and related studies provide strong evidence 
that asymmetric learning is important in real-world labor markets.  Second, the more direct test 
found in DeVaro and Waldman (2006) finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis.  Third, the 
hypothesis is consistent with two important empirical findings concerning promotion processes, 
i.e., large wage increases upon promotion but wage increases upon promotion being small 
relative to wage differences across adjacent job levels.12
 In addition to the positives discussed above, there are also some important negatives.  
Specifically, some of the important empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics 
seem inconsistent with learning being purely asymmetric.  Two stand out.  First and most 
importantly, in a model of pure asymmetric learning a worker’s salary increase in a period in 
which the worker is not promoted should be completely determined by observable characteristics 
                                                     
12 The approach is consistent with wage increases upon promotion being small relative to wage differences across 
adjacent levels if workers accumulate general human capital as they age.  The approach can also explain the 
empirical finding discussed earlier that wage increases upon promotion are positively related to the number of 
workers at the level from which the promoted worker is drawn.  That is, this prediction is consistent with the 
promotion-as-signal hypothesis since the signaling value of a promotion should be positively related to the number 
of workers who were competing for the promotion. 
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such as schooling, labor-market experience, and firm tenure.  But numerous studies such as 
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,1994b) make it clear that wage increases for non-promoted 
workers vary substantially and cannot be solely explained by observables.  Second, the approach 
does not easily capture the finding that the size of wage increases early at a job level forecast 
speed of promotion.  The reason is that in a standard-asymmetric-learning model a firm does not 
want to reveal positive information about a worker when there is no return in terms of 
productivity, so in periods in which a worker is not promoted the firm should not give higher 
wage increases to the higher productivity workers.13         
 
D) Symmetric Learning with Human-Capital Acquisition and Job Assignment
 The last approach I discuss is the symmetric learning approach to wage and promotion  
dynamics first explored in Gibbons and Waldman (1999b).  That approach combines symmetric 
learning with two other standard building blocks concerning how internal labor markets operate 
– human-capital acquisition as in Becker (1962,1964) and job assignment as in Rosen (1982) and 
Waldman (1984b).  This approach is the one most successful at capturing the wide variety of 
empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics found in the internal-labor-market 
literature.  But even this approach has some drawbacks concerning trying to match the evidence. 
 
1) Basic Description 
 The Gibbons and Waldman framework is similar to Waldman’s and Bernhardt’s analyses 
discussed previously, except Gibbons and Waldman assume symmetric rather than asymmetric 
learning.  As indicated, Gibbons and Waldman combine symmetric learning, human-capital 
accumulation, and job assignment.  In their model all workers look identical when they enter the 
                                                     
13 The above argument implicitly assumes workers with the same observable characteristics.  If workers have 
different observable characteristics such as heterogenous schooling levels, then it is possible that a large wage 
increase early on due, for example, to higher schooling could predict speed of promotion if, as is plausibly the case, 
workers with higher schooling also on average get promoted more quickly.  This could explain the Baker, Gibbs, 
and Holmstrom findings concerning wage increases early on predicting promotion since that test does not control 
for the schooling level.  It would be easy to investigate this argument by seeing whether the empirical finding 
continues to hold even after schooling is controlled for. 
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labor market but actually they vary in terms of their innate abilities, where at the end of each 
period all firms observe a worker’s output and update their beliefs concerning each worker’s 
innate ability.  As in Harris and Holmstrom (1982) discussed earlier, this learning is gradual 
because of a stochastic term in the production function.  Another key assumption is that workers 
accumulate general human capital as they age with the result that “effective” ability grows over a 
worker’s career although expected effective ability falls when the realization for output is very 
low.  Also, there are three job levels which vary in terms of the extra productivity associated 
with effective ability, where the human-capital accumulation process means workers on average 
move up the job ladder as they age.  Finally, wages are determined by spot-market contracting. 
 Gibbons and Waldman show that this framework captures most of the basic empirical 
findings concerning internal-labor-market wage and promotion dynamics discussed in 
Subsection II.A.  For example, the model explains why real-wage decreases are not rare but 
demotions are.  Real-wage decrease are not rare because the learning process means that a 
worker should receive a real-wage decrease when realized output is sufficiently low that 
expected effective ability falls, but this rarely translates into a demotion since a demotion also 
requires expected effective ability to cross a critical value at which productivity across the two 
jobs is the same.  The model also explains large wage increases upon promotion since promoted 
workers on average are those with large increases in expected effective ability, and that large 
wage increases early at a job level predict quicker promotion.  This follows given that a large 
wage increase early on means significant growth in expected effective ability and higher 
expected effective ability means that, on average, the worker will achieve the expected effective 
ability required for promotion more quickly.  The model also explains serial correlation in wage 
increases, that wage increases at promotion are small relative to the differences between average 
wages across adjacent job levels, and is consistent with serial correlation in promotion rates.14  
                                                     
14 Gibbons and Waldman show their framework exhibits serial correlation in promotion rates in their full-
information benchmark analysis, although they are unable to show that it necessarily exhibits serial correlation in 
promotion rates under symmetric learning. 
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 Gibbons and Waldman also show that this framework can explain many of the results 
concerning performance evaluations discussed in Subsection II.C given the additional 
assumption that supervisors evaluate individuals relative to other workers with the same labor-
market experience.  This part of their analysis builds on a discussion in Harris and Holmstrom 
(1982).  For example, Medoff and Abraham (1980,1981) find that within a job wages are 
positively related to labor-market experience while performance evaluations are either unrelated 
or slightly negatively related to experience.  In the Gibbons and Waldman framework, within a 
job wages are positively related to labor-market experience because general human capital 
increases with experience.  But if workers are evaluated relative to others with the same labor-
market experience, then performance evaluations within a job will fall with experience because 
workers with high expected innate ability are promoted out of the job as they age while those 
with low expected innate ability are promoted into the job.  The framework also explains 
differences found between cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of the same data set and 
why performance evaluations predict both future promotions and future wage increases. 
 
2. Theoretical Extensions and Related Empirical Tests 
 Important theoretical extensions of this framework appear in Gibbons and Waldman 
(2006).  That paper first addresses empirical findings concerning the role of schooling in wage 
and promotion dynamics (these are the findings discussed in Subsection II.B).  Specifically, in 
this model workers vary in terms of their publicly observable schooling levels, where a higher 
schooling level means expected innate ability is higher.  They show that this enrichment allows 
the model to capture the major empirical findings discussed in Subsection II.B.  For example, the 
model provides an explanation for why higher schooling improves promotion probabilities.  That 
is, higher schooling means higher starting levels of expected effective ability which, in turn, 
means expected effective ability on average grows faster and passes the critical value for 
expected effective ability required for promotion more quickly.  The model also explains why 
schooling is positively related to the wage even after controlling for experience and job 
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assignment and why the returns to experience may be positively related to schooling, although 
remember the evidence on this issue is mixed.  
 In the second part of their 2006 paper Gibbons and Waldman address cohort effects (see 
also Gibbons and Waldman (2004)).  Remember, cohort effects mean that, even after controlling 
for differences in the composition of the workers in a cohort, a cohort’s average wage years after 
entry into a firm reflects to some degree the cohort’s average starting wage.  Their 1999 model is 
not consistent with this finding, but in their 2006 paper they show that the framework is 
consistent with cohort effects when task-specific human capital is incorporated.  Task-specific 
human capital means that the human capital accumulated during a period of work is more 
valuable in later periods when the worker is on a job where the tasks are similar.  Specifically, 
Gibbons and Waldman assume that a worker assigned to the high-level job when old is more 
productive when the worker was also assigned to the high-level job when young.  They show 
that this enrichment allows their framework to capture the type of cohort effects found by Baker, 
Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a,b) if, during boom periods, entering cohorts both earn higher 
wages and enter the firm on average at higher levels of the job ladder.  This approach can also 
explain the economy-wide cohort effects and industry-level cohort effects found in recent papers 
such as Kahn (2006), Oyer (2006), and Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2006). 
 A number of recent studies empirically estimate the Gibbons and Waldman (1999) model 
using large data sets from other countries (US data sets do not typically contain information on 
job level, so other country’s data sets that include this type of information are needed to test this 
model).  One such study is Lluis (2005).  She uses longitudinal data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel and generalized method of moments techniques.  Her results are generally 
supportive of the framework, although the evidence that learning helps determine job assignment 
is weak.  In particular, she finds some evidence consistent with learning being important in job 
assignment for younger workers, but the evidence for older workers is weak.15  She hypothesizes 
                                                     
15 Lima and Pereira (2003) is a related study that employs Portugese data.  They find a result similar to this result of 
Lluis.  That is, one focus of that paper is what factors drive the wage premia associated with promotion, where they 
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that the weak evidence for learning may be due to the apprenticeship system in Germany because 
much of the learning about worker ability may occur during the apprentice period.  But an 
alternative explanation, as discussed next, is that her findings are in fact what a more complete 
analysis of the Gibbons and Waldman framework would predict. 
 
3. Pros and Cons     
 The pros here are straightforward.  The theoretical analyses show that the approach is 
capable of explaining a very wide set of the empirical findings in the internal-labor-market wage 
and promotion dynamics literature.  These include what I have referred to as basic empirical 
findings, findings concerning the role of performance evaluations, and findings concerning the 
role of schooling.  Also, incorporating task-specific human capital, which seems to be a realistic 
enrichment, allows the model to explain cohort effects which is an empirical phenomenon that 
has gained significant empirical support recently. 
 On the negative side there are two related issues.  First, Gibbons and Waldman do not 
focus much on the idea that given symmetric learning, at least under their assumption that innate 
ability is a fixed attribute of the worker, most learning should occur early in careers.  This is 
potentially problematic if empirical findings for older workers can only be explained by 
assuming learning is significant.  Second, as discussed above, a number of the empirical 
investigations of the Gibbons and Waldman framework find evidence for symmetric learning 
only for younger workers.   
 As a final point, it is unclear to me how significant these issues are.  In their 1999 paper 
Gibbons and Waldman show that many of the empirical findings in the literature can be 
explained in their framework under the assumption of full information.  It is thus possible the 
two issues discussed above are not problems for their framework at all.  As stated above, in a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
find that towards the bottom of the job ladder learning is an important factor behind these wage premia while at the 
top learning is unimportant.  Hunnes (2006) uses Norwegian data and an empirical methodology similar to that 
employed by Lluis (2005).  Hunnes finds stronger evidence for learning, but in his analysis the strongest evidence 
appears at the top levels of the hierarchy.  See also Dias da Silva and van der Klaauw (2006). 
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world of fixed innate worker attributes, learning should be mostly confined to the early part of 
workers’ careers.  So possibly the correct perspective is that the Gibbons and Waldman 
framework provides the right explanation for the main empirical findings in Section II, where at 
low values of labor-market experience it is their symmetric-learning arguments that apply while 
at high levels their full-information arguments apply.  Further theoretical and empirical work 
exploring this possibility would be helpful. 
 
E) Overview and Synthesis
 Among the candidate models considered (which I chose because I believed they were the 
models with the most empirical support), clearly the framework that combines symmetric 
learning, human-capital accumulation, and job assignment is the one the literature currently 
suggests is best able to explain empirical findings concerning internal-labor-market wage and 
promotion dynamics.  Of course, it is possible this is the case because the other frameworks have 
not been developed in ways that make clear the extent to which these other frameworks have the 
ability to explain the empirical evidence.  But I believe this is unlikely.  The more plausible 
interpretation is that symmetric learning, human-capital accumulation, and job assignment are all 
important elements in the operation of real-world internal labor markets. 
 But I also believe careful study of the evidence does not support the idea that the basic 
model investigated in Gibbons and Waldman (1999) is sufficient for explaining the evidence.  
Rather, various enrichments of the model seem important.  First, both because of its real-world 
plausibility and because of the growing evidence supporting cohort effects, incorporating task-
specific human capital as in Gibbons and Waldman (2006) seems important.  Second, the 
evidence in favor of asymmetric learning such as Gibbons and Katz (1991) along with recent 
direct evidence in favor of the promotion-as-signal hypothesis suggests that an element of 
asymmetric learning also needs to be incorporated.  In other words, most current models assume 
learning is either purely symmetric or purely asymmetric, but in fact there is no reason that real-
world learning cannot be a mix of the two.  And my sense is that the evidence supports this. 
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 Also, incentives associated with promotion must also be important.  But it is unclear 
whether it is best to incorporate the type of exogenous tournament explored by Lazear and Rosen 
(1981), or whether, along the lines of Zabojnik and Bernhardt’s (2001) analysis, endogenous 
tournaments based on the promotion-as-signal hypothses are more realistic.  The difference 
concerns whether the firm commits to optimal values for future high wages associated with 
promotions or whether these future high wages arise endogenously as the result of signaling.  
Future empirical work focused on distinguishing between these possibilities would be of interest. 
 The evidence also suggests that the Gibbons and Waldman assumption of spot 
contracting is not fully accurate.  Many empirical findings point to the “market” being important 
in wage determination, so a spot-contracting assumption will typically give better predictions 
and explanations than a model in which workers are completely insulated from the demand for 
their 
services in the aggregate labor market.16  But there are aspects of the evidence such as nominal 
wage rigidity, the type of cohort effects found by Beaudry and DiNardo, and Green Card effects 
that constrain the salaries of those at the high end of a job’s salary range that suggest that wages 
do deviate from the market wage in important ways (see Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) for a 
related empirical analysis and discussion).  It is an open question whether these types of 
deviations can be incorporated into the theoretical modeling other than in an ad hoc fashion. 
 As a final point, there are a few subjects that deserve more attention both at the  
theoretical and empirical levels.  One such subject is the connection between internal-labor-
market wage and promotion dynamics and the turnover decision.  How a worker’s career 
progresses during his or stay at a single employer should be closely related to both voluntary and 
involuntary turnover decisions and also how the worker performs at the new job.  On the 
empirical side there are a few papers that develop evidence along these lines.  For example, 
Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994a,1994b) has a number of results concerning entry and exit 
                                                     
16 See Lazear and Oyer (2004) for a recent analysis that shows that, even in a highly regulated market like 
Sweden’s, the evidence indicates that the market is important in wage determination. 
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rates at different levels and also some comparisons of wage growth and promotion outcomes for 
new entrants versus incumbents, while Treble et al. (2001) provides a similar empirical analysis.  
But more empirical investigation of this issue would be helpful.  Similarly, there is limited 
theoretical work connecting internal-labor-market wage and promotion practices with turnover 
outcomes and, especially if the empirical literature matures to the point that the facts are clear, 
more theoretical attention to the topic could prove to be very fruitful.17
 Another subject that deserves more attention is bonus payments.  Most of the empirical 
research in this literature focuses on salaries rather than bonuses.  This is probably because 
salary data is frequently more readily available and because some of the early empirical work in 
this literature focused on salaries and ignored bonuses.  But there is work such as Lin (2005) 
which includes evidence concerning bonuses and the findings suggest bonuses work quite 
differently than salaries.  For example, Lin finds that bonuses vary more with aggregate 
economic conditions than do salaries and also that within a level bonuses vary more than do 
salaries.  These type of results suggest that salary and bonus play somewhat different roles in 
compensating workers and thus that further empirical and theoretical work on this issue could be 
fruitful.18
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HUMAN-RESOURCE PRACTICES 
 An important topic in the study of internal labor markets is the type of human-resource 
practices firms employ in order to increase the productivity and effectiveness of their workers.  
And in particular, much of the recent literature on this topic has focused on “traditional” versus 
“innovative” human-resource practices.  In this section I focus on the empirical literature on the 
subject, while Section V discusses the theoretical literature and Section VI discusses 
international differences concerning internal labor markets most of which can be connected to 
                                                     
17 Recent theoretical work that starts to move in this direction includes Munasinghe (2005), Ghosh (2007), and 
Ricchetti (2007). 
18 See Ricchetti (2007) for an interesting recent empirical and theoretical investigation focused on how bonuses 
vary across hierarchical levels.  
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differences in human-resource practices (see Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (2003) for an 
earlier survey that covers the material found in this section in more depth). 
 
A) The Basics
 The literature on human-resource practices makes a distinction between what are referred 
to as traditional practices and innovative practices.  Traditional practices refer to practices that 
were predominant in the US prior to the 1980s while innovative practices have become more 
common recently.  Traditional practices are less focused on ensuring that a firm’s workers are 
high skilled, that incentives for superior performance are high, and that information sharing is 
high.  These practices include hourly pay or salary compensation where there is little connection 
between pay and performance, narrowly defined jobs and no job rotation, limited screening for 
other than managerial employees, no work teams or quality circles, little formal on-the-job 
training, and the use of layoffs when product demand declines. 
 In contrast, innovative practices are focused more on recruiting and developing workers 
with high skills, eliciting high performance, and sharing of information.  These practices include 
the use of problem-solving teams and quality circles, job rotation, more effort and resources put 
into worker screening during the recruitment process, more on-the-job training, more use of 
incentive pay that can take various forms, and higher job security.  As discussed in more detail in 
the next section where the theoretical literature is discussed, these practices seem to constitute a 
set of complementary or interlocking parts where a main goal is a transformation of how 
decisions are made in the organization.  That is, one of the goals of the employment of these 
practices is a shift in decision making away from the managers towards production workers. 
 As discussed in Cole (2000), these practices first emerged among a limited set of large 
Japanese manufacturers in the 1960s and then became widespread among large Japanese 
manufacturers in the late 1960s and 1970s.  These practices served to improve the quality 
performance of these large Japanese manufacturers and in order to successfully compete US 
firms began to adopt these practices starting in the 1980s.  A number of studies such as Osterman 
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(1994,2000), Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford (1995), and Cappelli and Neumark (2001) 
document the adoption of these practices in US firms and, in particular, show rapid growth in 
adoption during the 1980s and 1990s.19  As an example, Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford find 
that the use of problem-solving teams almost doubled among large US firms between 1987 and 
1993. 
 In terms of understanding the time-series evidence, it is also useful to consider in greater 
detail what led over time to the increased employment of these practices.  First, survey evidence 
like that found in Osterman (2000) shows that early adopters tended not to revert back over time 
to the use of more traditional practices.  Also, a significant part of the growth in the use of these 
practices was due to a higher proportion of firms employing these practices over time.  But this 
is not the sole source of the growth.  Rather, there is also clear evidence that firms that employ 
innovative practices tend to employ larger numbers later periods (see again Osterman (2000)). 
 
B) Different Types of Evidence
 Before discussing the effects on firm performance of the adoption of innovative practices, 
let me briefly discuss the different types of evidence that have been brought to bear on the issue.  
There are a number of different approaches.  Early studies that looked at the impact of 
innovative-human-resource practices tended to be case studies typically of a single firm or a 
small set of firms.  Well known studies that take this approach include Krafcik (1988) and Wilms 
(1995) that look at a single auto assembly plant, Berg et al. (1996) that focus on apparel 
manufacturing, and Ichniowski (1992) that looks at paper manufacturing. 
 Although these types of studies certainly provide valuable evidence, they can also be 
limited in that inferences are drawn from observations concerning a small number of firms or 
factories within firms.  And in such a study there is the possibility that effects being found are 
not in fact due to the adoption of innovative work practices, but rather to some other difference 
                                                     
19 See also Ichniowski, Delaney, and Lewin (1989), Black and Lynch (1996,2004), and Gittleman, Horrigan, and 
Joyce (1998). 
32 
that is correlated with the employment of innovative practices.  For example, maybe innovative 
practices tend to be employed on average by higher quality managers and it is these managers 
rather than the practices per se that are responsible for the higher productivity frequently 
associated with innovative practices.  This type of scenario provides an alternative explanation 
for Krafcik’s and Wilms’ findings in their classic studies of the NUMMI auto assembly plant.20   
 In order to avoid some of the shortcomings of the standard case-study approach, a 
number of recent papers employ what has come to be called “insider econometrics” (see 
Ichiowski and Shaw (2007) for a detailed description of this approach).  This approach combines 
the best aspects of the case-study methodology with the positive aspects of systematic statistical 
analysis.  In this approach researchers first do the equivalent of a case study to understand the 
nature of the production process and the data needed to test well-formulated hypotheses.  Then, 
after collecting the required data, state-of-the-art statistical techniques are employed to 
investigate which of various hypotheses are supported by the data.  This approach provides the 
highest quality evidence in this area, so much of the discussion that follows focuses on these 
studies. 
 Within the insider-econometrics approach, there are two distinct sets of papers.  One set 
focuses on single firms while the other looks at multiple factories and firms within the same 
industry.  Examples of the former include Lazear’s (2000) study of piece rates on the 
productivity of workers installing windshields, Nagin et al.’s (2002) study of piece-rate pay and 
call center productivity, and Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan’s (2003) study of teams in apparel 
production (see also Knez and Simester (2001), Bartel (2004), and Freeman and Kleiner (2005)).  
Examples of the latter include Dunlop and Weil’s (1996) analysis of module versus bundle 
production in the apparel industry, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi’s (1997) study of various 
innovative work practices in steel production, and Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw’s (2007) 
                                                     
20 In that case a plant shut down by General Motors was reopened as a joint venture by GM and Toyota using many 
of the same workers but Toyota management.  Upon reopening innovative work practices were introduced and 
productivity improved.  But a case study approach cannot easily answer the extent to which the improved 
productivity was due to the innovative practices versus other changes associated with the new management. 
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follow-up study of steel production (see also MacDuffie (1995), MacDuffie and Pil (1996), and 
Kelley (1996)). 
 A final set of studies are those that conduct nationwide cross-industry surveys of 
businesses concerning their human-resource practices.  These studies are useful for documenting 
the prevalence of innovative human-resource practices within a country at a date in time, but are 
somewhat limited in terms of understanding the details of what drives the employment of these 
practices and the impact of these practices.  Examples of such studies focused on the US include 
Huselid and Becker (1996), Black and Lynch (2001,2004), and Cappelli and Neumark (2001), 
while studies focused on other countries include Greenan and Guellec (1997) on France, Michic 
and Sheehan (1999) on Great Britain, and Eriksson (2003) on Denmark.   
 
C) Basic Effects of the Adoption of Innovative Work Practices
 The extensive empirical investigation of the adoption of innovative-human-resource 
practices makes clear that in most cases adoption of such practices increases productivity.  Of 
course, this is not surprising.  It is unlikely the employment of these practices would become 
increasingly more common over time unless there was a return associated with their use.  In 
terms of understanding which theories explain the returns and growing use of these practices, 
however, what is needed is more detailed evidence concerning the nature of these returns and 
more detail concerning patterns of adoption.  
 One finding is that the increased productivity associated with the use of innovative work 
practices is not always solely due to the increased productivity of an existing workforce, but can 
also be partly due to upgrading of the workforce.  For example, Lazear (2000) investigated 
worker productivity and firm profitability at the Safelite Glass Corporation after the firm moved 
from hourly pay to piece-rate pay.  Consistent with standard economic theory of incentive pay, 
worker productivity of the existing workforce rose.  But this only accounted for about half of the 
overall rise in productivity at the firm.  The other half was the result of an improved ability in 
recruitment to attract highly productive workers and possibly fewer exits of the most productive 
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workers.  A second related example is found in Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan’s (2003) 
analysis of an apparel factory.  In their analysis a move from individual piece rates to team 
production and team-based incentive pay raised productivity substantially, where in fact the high 
productivity workers, i.e., those most likely to be hurt monetarily by moving away from 
individual piece rates, were the first to voluntarily join the newly forming teams. 
 The next finding concerns the details concerning the manner in which innovative 
practices help the productivity of an existing workforce.  Not surprisingly, there is clear evidence 
that adopting a larger number of innovative practices increases productivity more than adopting 
one or a few practices.  This is not surprising since, if this were not the case, it would be hard to 
understand why firms that employ innovative practices seem on average to employ larger 
numbers as time passes.  What is of more interest is the substantial evidence indicating that the 
productivity increase associated with employing a bundle of innovative practices is not simply 
the sum of increases associated with each practice individually.  Rather, the productivity increase 
associated with employing a bundle of practices frequently significantly exceeds this sum. 
 A study that nicely captures this idea is the classic study of steel production found in 
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997).  That paper employs a panel data set that covers almost 
all of the finishing lines in integrated steel mills in the US.  For these lines they consider 26 
different human-resource-management practices which they then translate into four systems of 
practices – a system that employs mostly traditional practices, a system that employs mostly 
innovative practices, and two intermediate systems.  One intermediate system employs 
innovative practices focused mostly on communication and information sharing while the other 
adds teamwork and formal training.  A main finding is that, comparing across these four 
systems, the more innovative practices employed the higher on average was worker productivity.  
In fact, the system that employed a full set of innovative practices raised productivity on average 
more than twice the amount of the system associated with the next highest number of innovative 
practices.  Further, the introduction of any single practice had a statistically insignificant effect 
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on productivity.  So the conclusion is that innovative work practices improve productivity, but in 
addition there seem to be strong complementarities. 
 A number of other studies have also found or argued for important complementarities.  
For example, Knez and Simester (2001) study the introduction by Continental Airlines of an 
employee bonus based on firm-wide performance, where contrary to the standard free-riding 
argument Knez and Simester find evidence consistent with this firm-wide performance bonus 
improving productivity.  They argue (and present anecdotal evidence consistent with their 
argument) that the use of teams or work groups at the firm increased the extent of mutual 
monitoring which is what allowed the firm-wide bonus to be successful.  Similarly, in their paper 
on apparel manufacturing, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan suggest that it was the simultaneous 
introduction of module production and group-incentive pay that allowed the introduction of 
teamwork to significantly increase productivity. 
 In addition to the effects on productivity, there is also a question of how the introduction 
of innovative work practices affects other important outcome variables, in particular, output 
quality and firm profitability (an increase in productivity does not necessarily translate into 
increased profits since innovative work practices can also translate into increased costs).  As was 
the case for productivity, there is strong evidence that introducing innovative practices positively 
affects output quality.  This has been found in various studies including MacDuffie (1995), 
Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), and Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007).  The 
evidence for a positive profit impact is a bit weaker but at least in some cases one can infer that 
profits were also positively affected.  For example, in their analysis of steel finishing lines 
Ichniowki, Shaw, and Prennushi estimate a significant profit increase for the lines that employed 
the full set of innovative practices.  Of course, the fact that these innovative practices have not 
been universally adopted suggests that the profitability of these practices might vary across 
different settings.  I turn to this issue now.  
 
D) Further Effects and Patterns of Adoption
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 In addition to detailed evidence concerning the effects of adopting innovative work 
practices, evidence has also developed concerning patterns of adoption.  As discussed earlier, in 
the US innovative practices started to be adoped in the early 1980s and there has been substantial 
growth since then both in the number of firms employing these practices and the number of 
practices the average such firm employs.  But this diffusion has not been random.  One clear 
pattern concerning adoption is that innovative practices are much more common in new factories 
and factories that have reopened under new management (see, for example, Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie (1986), Ichniowsi and Shaw (1995), and Ichniowki, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997)). 
 There are three possible explanations for this finding.  First, there may be transition costs 
associated with having an operating factory move from using traditional work practices to using 
innovative practices.  Since the first firms to adopt innovative practices should be those where 
the profitability of adoption is highest, if transition costs are significant then at any point in time 
adoption should be higher at new factories and reopened factories.  Second, there may be an 
agency problem.  It is possible that innovative work practices are profitable everywhere but, if a 
manager has little experience in managing a factory which employs innovative practices, it may 
not be in the manager’s best interests to have the switch occur (because, for example, it makes 
him or her more easily substituted with a manager who has such experience).  Third, it is 
possible that not all managers are sufficiently familiar with the productivity advantages 
associated with innovative practices and it is the managers at new factories and newly reopened 
factories that, on average, are more likely to know about these advantages.21   
 A second factor that is important in explaining who adopts innovative work practices is 
the complexity of the production process, where here the evidence is clearer that the reason is 
that the profitability of adoption is higher for more complex production processes.  For example, 
                                                     
21 One piece of evidence consistent with the first possibility is found in Ichniowki and Shaw (1995).  They find that 
the introduction of new managers who, on average, might be more open to change does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the likelihood that a production line or factory changes from traditional to innovative practices.  
On the other hand, Lynch (2007) has recently found results consistent with the third possibility.  That is, she finds 
that employers who are best situated to learn about new practices are more likely to adopt innovative practices. 
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Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007) find that adoption rates for innovative practices are higher 
and the profitability of adoption is higher for production lines that make more complex shapes.  
Similarly, Dunlop and Weil (1996) find that innovative work practices – in particular, what they 
refer to as module production – are employed by apparel manufacturers that produce smaller 
batches and employ quicker turnaround.  This is not surprising since many innovative practices 
concern increased communication and improved problem solving by production workers and 
such practices quite plausibly have higher returns when production is more complex. 
 A final related finding is that the adoption of innovative practices is more likely and more 
profitable when the production process employs new computer-aided information technologies.  
Findings along this line appear numerous studies including Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Dunlop 
and Weil (1996), and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002).  The obvious interpretation of 
this finding is that it is a specific example of the earlier point that innovative work practices are 
more valuable and thus more likely to be adopted when production processes are more complex. 
 
V. THEORETICAL MODELS CONCERNING HUMAN-RESOURCE PRACTICES 
 This section discusses various theoretical models that have been put forth to explain the 
use of innovative-human-resource practices.  Much of the discussion focuses on the issue of 
complementary work practices, but I also discuss models that do not rely on complementarity. 
 
A) Complementary Practices
 The main theoretical approach for modeling the role of innovative-human-resource 
practices is to assume the practices are complementary.  Complementary activities refer to 
activities such that “if the levels of any of the subset of activities are increased, then the marginal 
return to increases in any or all of the remaining activities rises” (Milgrom and Roberts (1990), 
p. 514).  The idea that innovative work practices are complementary immediately explains why 
innovative practices are frequently employed in bundles and that the marginal return to adopting 
innovative practices can be increasing (over a range) in the number of practices adopted.  For an 
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example of the latter, complementary practices can explain Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi’s 
(1997) finding that the work system containing the highest number of innovative practices was 
associated with an increase in productivity more than double the increase associated with the 
work system associated with the next largest number of innovative practices. 
 An example of this type of argument is Milgrom and Roberts’ (1995) analysis of Lincoln 
Electric.  The Lincoln Electric case is a classic example of a firm characterized by innovative 
work practices.  Three of the practices employed by Lincoln Electric are as follows.  First, 
Lincoln made heavy use of piece rates.  All production workers and many non-production 
workers at the firm had their compensation at least partly determined by piece rates.  Second, 
initially accomplished through direct stock purchases and later through an ESOP, a large 
proportion of the firm’s stock was held by the firm’s employees.  Third, there was a high degree 
of job security accomplished through a no-layoff policy. 
 Milgrom and Roberts (1995) provide an explanation for these three practices using the 
idea of complementarity.  It is well known that piece rates improve worker incentives, but there 
is the downside known as the “ratchet effect,” i.e., if outputs are too high then the firm learns the 
rate is too high and lowers the rate for subsequent periods.  In turn, if this is anticipated by 
workers, then the positive incentive effects of the piece rate are reduced.22  Milgrom and Roberts 
argue that Lincoln was able to avoid this problem through the high level of employee stock 
ownership.  The idea is that high employee stock ownership reduces the incentive for the firm to 
lower piece rates and in this way transfer rents from workers to the firm.  Finally, since layoffs 
are a way to reduce employee stock ownership, the no-layoff policy was used as a way to 
commit to a high level of employee stock ownership for future periods.23
  
B) Four Additional Arguments Concening Complementarities
                                                     
22 Theoretical analyses concerning the ratchet effect appear in Lazear (1986), Gibbons (1987), and Carmichael and 
MacLeod (2000). 
23 Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) discuss another complementarity in Lincoln’s practices which is a 
complementarity between Lincoln’s use of piece rates and its use of bonuses. 
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 The argument in Milgrom and Roberts (1995) concerning Lincoln Electric is just one  
example of theoretical arguments that have been put forth that describe how specific innovative 
work practices can be complementary.  In this subsection I describe four other important 
arguments of this type. 
 The first argument concerns the use of group-based incentive plans.  As discussed in 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972), the free-rider problem suggests that individual piece rates should 
be superior to group-based incentive plans.  But possibly because of the difficulty of measuring 
individual output, many firms employ group-based incentive plans rather than individual piece 
rates for a significant proportion of the workforce.  The argument is then that there are a number 
of other innovative work practices employed because they support the use of group-based 
incentive plans.  For example, Kandel and Lazear (1992) argue that firms may spend resources 
on activities like indoctrination and the formation of quality circles to establish and enforce 
group norms that ameliorate the free-rider problem through peer pressure (see also the related 
discussion in Kreps (1990) concerning corporate culture).  Also, because highly productive 
workers might not want to join a firm where incentives are tied to group rather than individual 
output, another innovative practice potentially complementary to group-based incentive plans is 
additional effort and resources spent on worker recruitment.24     
 A second argument focuses on the decentralization of decision making.  Many firms that 
have adopted innovative work practices employ practices like group-based decision-making 
teams and quality circles that move decision making from managers to lower level employees.  
This second argument is that various other innovative work practices are employed because they 
support this decentralization.  For example, if lower level employees make decisions, then it is 
important that these employees are cooperative, highly skilled, and provide high effort.  
                                                     
24 The empirical analysis in Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan (2003) discussed earlier throws some doubt on this 
particular theory of innovative work practices.  As discussed, in that analysis the firm was able to increase 
productivity by moving to a group-based incentive plan from individual piece rates.  This should not happen if, as 
argued above, group-based incentive plans are only used when individual piece rates are not feasible.  Also 
inconsistent with the above argument, Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan found that it was the high-productivity 
workers who on average were the first to voluntarily join the newly forming teams. 
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Cooperation can be achieved by group-based incentive plans consistent with the argument of 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) discussed in more detail below, higher skills can be achieved by 
higher levels of on-the-job training as in the argument of Aoki (1986), while high effort is also a 
consequence of group-based incentive plans.  Also, because new ideas can lead to the 
elimination of jobs, it is also important as argued by Aoki (1988) that firms offer high levels of 
employee security.  Along the same line Carmichael and MacLeod (1993), argue that practices 
like job rotation can add to the range of jobs to which a worker is assigned and this can help a 
firm commit to high levels of job security. 
 The third argument is that of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991,1994) concerning the need 
to balance incentives in a multitasking world.  A standard problem in the theory of multitasking 
is that incentive pay which is based on measurable output inefficiently distorts effort away from 
important tasks where the value to the firm is not measureable.  In particular, Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1994) translate this into an argument concerning complementarity.  Specifically, if the 
firm provides high incentive pay associated with measured performance, then it is important that 
the firm also employ practices that limit the resulting distortions.  Holmstrom and Milgrom argue 
that one way firms can do this is to couple high incentive pay with worker ownership of assets 
since, for example, ownership will cause workers to provide more effort and resources into 
maintaining the asset.  They also argue that, due to complementarity, high incentive pay should  
be coupled with more discretion on the part of workers concerning what the job entails. 
 In addition to a theoretical analysis, in their 1994 paper Holmstrom and Milgrom argue 
that their framework matches empirical evidence found in a number of studies.  Their theoretical 
approach predicts that high incentive pay, asset ownership by employees, and worker discretion 
should all covary positively.  For example, a change in an exogenous parameter that increases 
the return to using high incentive pay should increase the degree to which high incentive pay is 
used, but because of complementarity should also increase employee asset ownership and worker 
discretion.  This prediction is supported by empirical findings in Anderson and Schmittlein 
(1984) and Anderson (1985) concerning the choice between in-house sales agents and 
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independent sales agents in industrial selling.  They find covariation of just the type predicted.  
That is, independent sales agents had higher incentive pay, more discretion, and at least in one 
important dimension higher asset ownership.  Further, the variables predicting the choice 
between in-house and independent sales agents were also consistent with the theoretical 
predictions.  Holmstrom and Milgrom also relate their theoretical predictions to findings in a 
number of other studies including Shepard (1993) and Slade (1996) concerning gas stations and 
Brickley and Dark (1987) and Krueger (1991) concerning fast food. 
 The final argument is Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) theory of real versus formal authority.  
One of their main results is that in choosing whether to use centralized or decentralized decision 
making firms face a trade-off between incentives and agency costs.  On the one hand, 
decentralization increases incentives for workers to acquire information.  On the other, there is 
an agency cost because the interests of the employees and the firm are not typically perfectly 
aligned.  In turn, this logic results in decentralization through practices such as problem-solving 
teams and quality circles to be complementary with increased use of incentive pay.  The 
argument is that higher incentive pay serves to ameliorate the agency-problem associated with 
decentralization by aligning workers’ interests with those of the firm.25
 
C) Other Theoretical Models
 This subsection discusses theoretical models concerning innovative work practices that  
do not focus on complementarities.  Rotember (1994) focuses on altruism in the workplace, 
where he argues that in the presence of altruism group-based compensation can increase worker 
productivity.  The argument is straightforward.  Given group-based compensation and altruism, 
each worker increases his or her effort level because the worker internalizes to some extent the 
effects added effort has on other workers’ compensation.  Rotember also argues that it can be 
profitable for a firm to induce altruism in this type of setting by allowing time for socialization 
                                                     
25 Acemoglu et al. (2006) in a recent paper extends the theory to produce testable implications and then provides 
supporting evidence using both French and British data from the 1990s. 
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and other related behaviors.  Overall, Rotemberg’s argument is a quite plausible additional 
mechanism to Kandel and Lazear’s peer-pressure argument for how the free-rider problem can 
be avoided in firms characterized by group-based compensation. 
 Ortega (2001) provides a new explanation for job rotation.  Rather than focusing on 
benefits job rotation may have in developing an employee’s human capital, Ortega argues that 
the returns to job rotation are mostly in terms of firm learning.  In Ortega’s model the firm is 
initially uncertain about the productivity of its various workers at each worker’s various potential 
job assignments, while there is also uncertainly concerning the potential profitability of these 
various jobs.  He shows that in this setting job rotation is superior to job specialization in terms 
of how much the firm learns along these two dimensions.26    Hence, job rotation should be 
employed when the returns in terms of learning are high and costs are low. 
 In addition to presenting the theory, Ortega argues that this theory is a good match for 
empirical evidence concerning job rotation.  He focuses on two pieces of evidence.  First, as 
found by Campion, Cheraskin, and Stevens (1994), the use of job rotation is negatively related to 
a worker’s value for firm tenure.  Second, as found by Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce (1998), 
the use of job rotation is positively related to whether the firm is using a new technology.  Ortega 
argues that each of these findings is consistent with his theory.  First, high tenure means that the 
firm already has a lot of information about the worker so the additional information that can be 
gathered through job rotation is of little value.  Second, new technology means job rotation is 
valuable because the firm has little information about its current jobs.27
 Zabojnik (2002) focuses on centralization versus decentralization.  In particular, this 
paper considers a setting similar to that considered by Aghion and Tirole (1997) discussed 
                                                     
26 Ortega (2001) builds on Meyer (1994) which also looks at the effect that job assignment can have on the rate 
firms learn about workers’ abilities but which does not specifically focus on job rotation. 
27 Ortega also argues that the human-capital explanation for job rotation is inconsistent with the evidence.  But this 
seems less clear cut to me.  In terms of the human-capital theory, it is possible that what is valuable is a little bit of 
experience on a number of jobs.  In turn, this version of the human-capital theory is consistent with the evidence in 
that high tenure means the worker likely already has at least a little experience on a number of jobs so additional job 
rotation is not needed, while new technology means workers do not have the needed experience with the firm’s 
current jobs so additional job rotation is very valuable. 
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above.  The main point is that a firm may decentralize decision making through practices like 
problem-solving teams even when managers are better informed than production workers.  The 
reason is that it can be cheaper to induce workers to provide high effort when the project or 
method of production chosen is that favored by the workers rather than the one favored by the 
manager.  In other words, to the extent workers provide higher effort when they believe the 
project or method of production has a higher likelihood of succeeding, the firm may be able to 
increase productivity by letting the workers decide even when the manager is better informed.28
 The last paper I consider in this subsection is Akerlof and Kranton (2005).  They take the 
perspective common in sociology and psychology that norms matter.  In particular, how an 
employee behaves in a particular situation such as how much effort a worker expends depends 
on the situation and the worker’s identity, where identity refers to the worker’s social category 
(such as man or woman, black or white, etc.) and the worker’s self-image.  The basic idea is that 
a worker who identifies with the firm or work group will, monetary incentives held fixed, choose 
higher effort than will a worker who does not identify with the firm or relevant work group. 
 This perspective can explain the employment of a number of innovative work practices.  
The basic idea is that, because a worker provides higher effort when he or she identifies with the 
firm or work group, the firm has an incentive to adopt practices that serve to foster this type of 
identification.  So, for example, it might be worthwhile for a firm to adopt high levels of 
screening during the recruitment process because screening can be used to ensure that new 
employees are of a type conducive to identifying with the firm or work group.  Or similarly, the 
formation of work groups may be beneficial because workers more easily identify with a work 
group than with the firm itself.  One problem with this argument, however, is that Akerlof and 
Kranton argue that identification is a substitute for monetary incentives.  To the extent this is the 
case, then we should expect the practices just mentioned not to be used in conjunction with high 
levels of incentive pay which is exactly the opposite of what the evidence suggests.  But possibly 
                                                     
28 Zabojnik shows this logic is only correct when workers face liquidity constraints which make it costly for firms 
to induce high worker effort strictly through contracting. 
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the Akerlof and Kranton discussion of this issue is incomplete in the sense that maybe certain 
types of incentive pay can be used to help establish identification, which in turn could explain 
why these practices are used together.  
  
D) Overview
 The evidence seems quite clear cut that complementarity is important for understanding 
the move towards innovative work practices.  There are a number of aspects of the evidence that 
point in this direction.  First, innovative work practices are frequently adopted in bundles.  
Second, there is evidence of an increasing marginal return in terms of productivity of adopting 
additional practices.  Third, the evidence suggests the return to adopting a single practice is 
either small or possibly even zero.  Each of these findings is consistent with the basic idea of 
complementarity which is that the return to adopting any specific practice is positively related to 
the number of other practices adopted. 
 So the most difficult question is, of the various theories concerning complementarity that 
have been proposed, which one or ones seem most promising as an explanation for the evidence?  
I think this is a question where the literature is far from giving a conclusive answer.  But I think 
some tentative conclusions can be drawn.  First, a number of the theories put forth have some 
support in the data, so my sense is that the right answer is not that there is a single theory that is 
correct and the others have no explanatory power.  Rather, it is likely the case that a number of  
the theories are important for understanding real-world organizations.   
 For example, as discussed, Holmstrom and Milgrom’s theory concerning balancing 
incentives in a multi-tasking world seems consistent with various studies concerning sales 
agents.  And similarly, as mentioned in footnote 24, Aghion and Tirole’s theory of real versus 
formal authority stands up well in a recent direct test of the theory.  There is some question 
concerning whether one of the basic premises of the free-riding argument is correct.  That is, 
given the popularity of group-based incentive plans and the findings in Hamilton, Nickerson, and 
Owan (2003) concerning the returns of moving from individual piece rates to group-based 
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incentive plans, it is questionable whether group-based incentive plans are used primarily when 
individual piece rates are not feasible (see footnote 23 for a brief discussion).  On the other hand, 
there are other parts of that argument that seem quite plausible.  That is, for whatever reasons 
group-based incentive plans are adopted, it seems quite plausible that activities used to enforce 
high-effort norms are employed as a way of avoiding the potential free-rider problem. 
 Second, to the extent one of the theories is the correct explanation for the bulk of the 
evidence, my vote is on the argument that focuses on moving decision making from managers to 
lower level employees.  On the one hand, this argument ties together the largest number of 
innovative practices.  Specifically, group-based decision making teams and quality circles are 
explained as practices that directly serve to decentralize decision making, while various other 
practices such as group-based incentive plans, high levels of on-the-job training, job rotation, 
and high levels of job security are employed as ways to support the decentralized decision 
making.  On the other hand, detailed empirical analysis such as Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi 
(1997) suggests that it is the extensive use of group-based decision making, i.e., decentralization, 
that is central for the increased productivity associated with innovative work practices.29  
 
VI. INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
 There is a companion literature to the one discussed in the previous two sections which  
concerns international differences concerning how internal labor markets operate, where this 
literature is closely related to the earlier one in that many of the differences can be thought of as 
differences in human-resource practices.  In this section I discuss the literature on international 
differences and, in particular, one focus is trying to understand what can be learned by thinking 
                                                     
29 In comparison to production lines that employ traditional work practices, Ichniowki, Shaw, and Prennushi find 
that productivity rises 6.7 percent for lines that employ a full set of innovative work practicies and 3.2 percent for 
lines that emphasize high teamwork and communications.  In contrast, productivity on average is only 1.4 percent 
higher for lines that emphasize communications with less stress on teamwork. 
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about the two literatures together.  Note that since most of the literature on international 
differences is focused on US-Japanese differences, that will be the focus here also.30
 
A) US-Japanese Differences
 In this subsection I describe the major differences that have been identified concerning  
the operation of US and Japanese internal labor markets.  In terms of a later discussion where I 
relate this literature to the literature discussed in the previous two sections that focuses on the 
growing use (mostly in the US) of innovative-human-resource practices, there are two points 
worth emphasizing.  First, many of these differences are closely related to differences in 
innovative- and traditional-human-resource practices discussed previously.  Second, much of the 
evidence showing large differences in the the operation of US and Japanese internal labor 
markets is from studies that are now decades old.  In a later subsection I come back to this point. 
 I start by describing the US-Japanese differences in internal-labor-market operation that 
are closely related to differences between traditional- and innovative-human-resource practices.  
First, a number of studies such as Kagono et al. (1985) and Lincoln, Hanada, and McBride 
(1986) find that decisions are made at lower levels of the hierarchy in Japanese firms than at US 
firms (see also the earlier work of Clark (1979) and Cole (1979)).  For example, Lincoln, 
Hanada, and McBride conducted a study of 55 US firms and 51 Japanese firms in terms of the 
hierarchical level at which decisions were made.  They found that in the Japanese firms decisions 
were made at lower hierarchical levels on average than in the US firms.  This finding is similar 
to the earlier discussion of innovative work practices wherein a number of innovative practices 
serve to move decision making away from managers and to lower level employees. 
 Second, there is substantial evidence that Japanese firms offer more on-the-job training 
and correspondingly Japanese employees have higher levels of firm-specific human capital (see, 
for example, Hashimoto (1994), MacDuffie and Kochan (1995), and Aoki and Okuno-Fujiwara 
                                                     
30 I would especially like to thank Hodaka Morita for suggestions and discussions that were helpful in my 
formulating the discussion in this section.  
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(1996)).  Further, much of this literature focuses on higher levels of multi-skilling in Japanese 
firms, where multi-skilling refers to acquiring the human capital needed to do multiple jobs 
which occurs, for example, with heavy use of job rotation. Studies that discuss the prevalence of 
multi-skilling in Japanese firms include Koike (1977,1988), Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow 
(1989), and Ito (1992).  Note that higher levels of on-the-job training and job rotation were also 
part of the discussion concerning innovative-human-resource practices. 
 Third, Japanese firms are characterized by higher levels of continuous process 
improvement.  For example, in Japanese firms, through group-decision making teams and quality 
circles, lower level employees are more frequently solicited for suggestions concerning 
improvements in the production process (see Koike (1988) for a discussion).  Also, Dertouzos, 
Lester, and Solow (1989) found that in steel production in the late 1980s in Japanese factories 
engineers were located in a manner that allowed for quicker responses to day-to-day operational 
problems than was the case in US steel production.   
 Fourth, long-term employment is higher and turnover rates are lower in Japanese firms.  
This has been found by numerous authors including Hashimoto and Raisian (1985), Mincer and 
Higuchi (1988), Blinder and Krueger (1996), and Kato (2001).  For example, Hashimoto and 
Raisian compared US and Japanese labor markets by analyzing data from the Special Labor 
Force Report for the US and the Basic Survey of Employment for Japan.  They found that long-
term job retention rates were higher in Japan and that average job tenure was also higher.  These 
ideas that long-term employment is higher and turnover is lower in Japanese firms are similar to 
the emphasis on job security in firms that employ innovative work practices. 
 The last two differences do not have a close relationship with the discussion of traditional 
and innovative work practices.  Fifth, as discussed, for example, in Holzhausen (2000), in 
Japanese firms promotion to managerial ranks occurs later in careers and correspondingly there 
is little differentiation in terms of wage and promotion rates for white-collar workers early in 
careers.  More specifically in terms of the latter point, in large Japanese firm early in careers 
workers with the same educational background are treated similarly in terms of wages, wage 
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growth, and promotion rates, but after approximately 10 to 15 years of experience wage growth 
and promotion decisions depend more heavily on performance evaluations.  Of further interest, 
although outcomes do not vary much early in careers, the evidence suggests that many young 
white-collar workers in Japan do have a clear sense of their long-term career prospects. 
 Sixth, within-firm income dispersion is smaller in Japan.  For example, Koike (1988) 
compares wage differentials between managers and average white-collar workers in Japan and 
various European countries and finds that Japan has one of the smallest wage differentials.  Since 
it is typically believed that within-firm income dispersion is higher in the US than in Europe, this 
clearly suggests much higher within-firm income dispersion in Japan than in the US. 
 
B) Candidate Models for Explaining US-Japanese Differences
 A number of the theoretical approaches for explaining US-Japanese differences in 
internal-labor-market operation rely on models characterized by multiple equilibria.  One set of 
models focus on the connection between adverse selection and turnover.  The best known of 
these papers is Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) which builds on Greenwald (1979,1986) and 
Gibbons and Katz (1991) (other studies that take an adverse selection/turnover approach for 
explaining US-Japanese differences include Prendergast (1989) and Chang and Wang (1995)).31
 Acemoglu and Pischke consider a labor-market setting in which a worker’s current 
employer knows more about a worker’s ability than do prospective employers, so turnover is 
reduced due to the resulting adverse-selection problem.  What is new here is the focus on on-the-
job training.  The adverse-selection problem means that a worker’s current employer has 
monopsony power after the training period.  This monopsony power gives the firm an incentive 
to offer and pay for general training of its workers (while at the same time reducing a worker’s 
incentive to pay for general training).  Based on this logic, Acemoglu and Pischke identify the 
possibility of multiple equilibria.  In what might be called the Japanese equilibrium, the adverse-
                                                     
31 Katz and Ziderman (1990) and Chang and Wang (1996) also consider similar models but do not relate their 
analyses to US-Japanese differences.  
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selection problem is severe causing little turnover and high monopsony power which, in turn, 
results in high on-the-job training.  In what might be called the US equilibrium, the adverse-
selection problem is mild so turnover is higher, monopsony power is lower, and the result is a 
lower level of on-the-job training.  In addition to developing the theoretical argument, Acemoglu 
and Pischke present evidence using data on German apprentices that supports the theory. 
 A second argument appears in Prendergast (1992).  Prendergast focuses on delayed 
promotion in the Japanese case and higher firm-specific human capital.  In Prendergast’s model 
each employer has private information about each of its young worker’s long-term career 
prospects and the firm must decide whether to reveal this information to workers which would 
increase incentives for workers with high potential.  In the US equilibrium firms promote young 
workers with high potential which signals potential and results in high incentives.  In the 
Japanese equilibrium, instead, the return to training low-ability young workers is high and firms 
choose to retain high incentives for low-ability workers by not promoting young workers and in 
this way not revealing private information.  One problem with this argument is that, as 
mentioned above, even though there are no promotions early in careers in Japan, many young 
white-collar workers in Japan do seem to have a clear sense of long-term career prospects.32   
 Morita (2001,2005) also presents a multiple-equilibrium argument, where his argument  
serves as an explanation for differences concerning human-capital accumulation including multi-
skilling, decentralized decision making, continuous process improvement, and turnover.  His 
argument builds on earlier discussions in Aoki (1986) and Koike (1988) and is related to the 
argument concerning decentralization in Subsection V.B.  Basically, Morita identifies a set of 
complementarities across these variables that leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria.  
When workers are multi-skilled they have the knowledge required to make better decisions, so 
                                                     
32 A related empirical result is found in Umezaki (2001) which shows a strong correlation in Japan between task 
assignments when young and subsequent promotion outcomes.  In other words, if young workers in Japan with 
better long-term career prospects are assigned different tasks, then in contrast to Prendergast’s argument, even in the 
absence of any differentiation when workers are young concerning wage and promotion outcomes, young workers 
should be able to infer their long-term prospects. 
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decentralized decision making becomes more attractive.  In turn, the combination of multi-
skilling and decentralized decision making makes continuous process improvement feasible, 
where over time the high levels of continuous process improvement mean that each firm is 
characterized by high levels of firm-specific human capital.  Finally, the high levels of firm-
specific human capital reduce turnover and increase average job duration. 
 In Morita’s argument continous process improvement is more beneficial when workers 
have high levels of firm tenure, so the return to adopting continuous process improvement is 
positively related to the number of other firms that adopt it.  That is, when other firms adopt 
continuous process improvement they are less likely to raid other firms’ employees because 
skills are not transferable, so job durations are higher which means any single firm has a higher 
incentive to adopt continuous process improvement.  The result is there can be two equilibria.  In 
the Japanese equilibrium all firms adopt continuous process improvement which lowers the 
turnover rate and makes this choice profitable.  On the other hand, in the US equilibrium firms 
do not adopt continuous process improvement which raises the turnover rate and makes choosing 
continuous process improvement unprofitable.  Morita argues that historical events during World 
War II can explain the different equilibrium choices across the two countries. 
 The last theoretical argument I discuss is the one found in Owan (2004) which employs 
the promotion-as-signal hypothesis.  There are two key assumptions in Owan’s model.  First, in 
addition to varying in terms of ability, a firm’s workers also vary in the quality of worker-firm 
matches.  Second, a worker’s current employer privately learns the worker’s ability before 
learning the quality of the worker-firm match.  Given these assumptions, Owan shows that 
depending on various factors such as the distribution of worker characteristics and the relative 
value of firm-specific human capital across jobs, one of two possible equilibria will arise.  In an 
early-promotion equilibrium high ability workers are promoted after the firm learns ability but 
before learning the quality of worker-firm matches, while in a late-promotion equilibrium there 
are no promotions until the firm learns both ability and the quality of worker-firm matches. 
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 The main point of Owan’s analysis is that the differences between these two potential 
equilibria match well with the differences in US-Japanese internal-labor-market operations 
discussed above.  Think of the late-promotion equilibrium as the Japanese equilibrium and the 
early-promotion equilibrium as the US equilibrium.  First, clearly the late-promotion equilibrium 
matches that promotions occur later in careers in Japan and that there is less differentiation in 
wage and promotion outcomes early in careers in Japan.  Second, Owan shows that the late-
promotion equilibrium has no turnover because the lack of early promotions serving as a signal 
causes adverse selection to be severe and the secondary market for workers to shut down, while 
in the early-promotion equilibrium high ability workers with bad matches leave their initial 
employers.  So the late-promotion equilibrium matches more long-term employment and less 
turnover in the Japanese case.  Third, the lack of promotion signaling in the late-promotion 
equilibrium means that the asymmetry of information is more severe in this equilibrium which 
results in less income dispersion.  This means the late-promotion equilibrium also matches the 
smaller level of income dispersion in the Japanese case.33  Finally, in addition to showing these 
results, Owan provides a discussion for why Japan seems to be characterized by the late-
promotion equilibrium and the US the early-promotion equilibrium, where like Morita’s similar 
discussion part of Owan’s discussion focuses on historical events.   
 
C) Convergence
 As is made clear above, much of the literature on US-Japanese differences was based on  
data or observations from decades ago.  This is potentially important.  From the discussion in 
Section IV we know that innovative work practices were introduced in Japan prior to being 
introduced in the US and after the introduction in the US there was and likely continues to be 
slow diffusion of these practices.  This suggests that, at least for the differences discussed above 
that are related to differences between traditional- and innovative-human-resource practices, the 
                                                     
33 Owan (1999) shows how a related model also explains why in Japan there are higher levels of firm-specific 
human capital. 
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differences are much smaller today than they were in the past.  Another way to put this is that a 
number of studies such as Osterman (1994,2000) and Cappelli and Neumark (2001) show that 
there has been significant growth over time in the employment of innovative-human-resource 
practices in the US while there is no similar empirical literature suggesting decreases over time 
in the use of innovative work practices in Japan.  Hence, at least for the differences discussed 
above that are related to differences between traditional and innovative work practices, these 
differences are likely much smaller today than they were say 20 or 30 years ago. 
 The idea that some of the differences today are much smaller than they were in the past 
introduces an interesting possibility concerning what drives these differences.  That is, it is likely 
that, at least for differences related to differences concerning traditional- and innovative-human-
resource practices, it was the later introduction of innovative work practices in the US and their 
slow diffustion that was a main driving force for many of the large differences observed between 
the US and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s.  As time passed and diffusion continued differences 
became smaller, and possibly substantially smaller.  Note that I am not claiming here that there is 
nothing to explain once one takes into account the later introduction of innovative work practices 
in the US and slow diffustion.  Rather, I am arguing that any full picture of what drives 
differences between the US and Japanese labor markets needs to take these ideas into account. 
 The other issue that this perspective suggests is the relative weight one should put onto 
the various international differences that have been identified concerning the US and Japan.  As 
innovative work practices have diffused in the US, a number of the differences that are related to 
innovative practices have very likely gotten smaller.  But for a couple of the differences there is 
little evidence suggesting convergence.  Specifically, in terms of later promotion in Japan and 
less differentiation in wage and promotion outcomes early on, lower income dispersion in Japan, 
and possibly lower turnover, I see little evidence for convergence.  So possibly future empirical 
work might focus on whether it is correct that convergence has been important for some 
differences but not for others, while future theoretical work might focus more on the differences 
which seem to be subject to less convergence.  
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D) Overview
 Since many of the differences between US and Japanese internal-labor-market operations 
are related to differences between traditional and innovative-human-resource practices in the US 
setting, there should be a close linkage between theories used to explain the movement from 
traditional towards innovative work practices in the US and theories used to explain differences 
between US and Japanese internal-labor-market operations.  Another way to put this is that, if 
part of what is driving the differences between US and Japanese internal-labor-market operations 
is that innovative work practices are more commonly used in Japan than in the US, then the 
arguments for what is happening in the US over time and the arguments concerning US-Japanese 
differences need to be tightly linked. 
 The above discussion concerning convergence is consistent with this idea.  It attributes at 
least some of the difference between US and Japanese internal-labor-market operations, and 
possibly much early on, to the later introduction of innovative work practices in the US and slow 
diffusion.  This is consistent with the discussion in Section IV which gave a prominent role to 
slow diffusion of innovative work practices in understanding the trends in the use of innovative 
work practices in the US setting.  In following up this idea, it might be of interest to compare 
current US and Japanese internal-labor-market operations, but only consider US firms which 
have adopted innovative work practices.  This would provide a sense of how much of the US-
Japanese differences in internal-labor-market operations is due to slow diffusion and how much 
is due to differences that remain even after US firms adopt innovative work practices (see 
Ichniowski and Shaw (1999) for a related analysis). 
 In addition, to the extent that there are remaining differences even after taking into 
account the slow diffusion which my guess is that there are, the question that remains is what 
drives these remaining differences?  Of the theories that I have reviewed, the one that I believe 
shows the most promise is the one presented in Morita (2001,2005).  On the one hand, for 
various reasons, the other arguments are somewhat lacking in terms of providing a convincing 
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explanation for the gamut of US-Japanese differences.  Prendergast’s (1992) model relies on 
young Japanese workers not knowing their career prospects which seems inconsistent with the 
evidence, while Owan’s (2004) model although interesting relies on an ad hoc assumption 
concerning job-match information being revealed later to firms than information about worker 
abilities.34  Also, although there is empirical support for Acemoglu and Pischke’s (1998) 
argument, the argument does not explain very many of the differences.  On the other hand, 
Morita’s argument explains a large number of differences, while it is also heavily focused on 
information sharing and decentralized decision making which are central in most descriptions of 
the differences between the US and Japanese settings. 
 But even Morita’s argument has the drawback that it does not explain one of the key US-
Japanese differences which is early promotion and early differentiation in the US setting and late 
promotion and late differentiation in the Japanese case.  Possibly, one could extend Morita’s 
argument to capture this important difference by focusing on how different levels of firm-
specific human capital affects whether equilibrium is characterized by early or late promotions.  
But this is a possibility that can only be resolved with further theoretical research on the topic.35
 Finally, although the discussion in this section focuses on differences between US and  
Japanese internal-labor-market operations because that is the focus of most of the literature, 
much of the discussion likely also applies to comparisons of Japanese internal labor markets with 
those found in many other industrialized countries.  That is, it is not just the case that innovative-
human-resource practices spread from Japan to the US and then slowly diffused in the US, but 
rather this later adoption and slow diffusion is also true of many other industrialized economies.  
                                                     
34 I do find other aspects of Owan’s argument appealing, so maybe much of what Owan argues is correct but there 
is a different explanation for why Japan is characterized by late promotions and the US early promotions. 
35 My idea here is related to Harris and Holmstrom’s (1982) argument discussed in Section III.  Firms would like to 
partially insure workers against uncertainty concerning true innate ability and one way to potentially do this is to 
employ late promotions and little differentiation early in careers.  This strategy is feasible in the Japanese case 
because the high levels of firm-specific human capital mean that a worker who is revealed to be of high innate 
ability early on cannot be hired away by another firm.  But in the US case, because of the lower levels of firm-
specific human capital, this strategy is infeasible because a young worker who is revealed to be of high innate 
ability who is not promoted or given a high wage would be bid away.  
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So, to the extent that many of the differences between the operation of US and Japanese internal 
labor markets discussed above are due to differences in the employment of innovative-human-
resource practices across the two countries, it would be natural to expect similar differences in 
internal-labor-market operations between Japan and other industrialized countries.36
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The literature on internal labor markets has matured to the point that for a number of 
branches of the literarure there is now a very healthy two-way interaction between theory and 
empirical work.  On the one hand, numerous theoretical papers try to provide explanations for 
empirical phenomena and, more specifically, for patterns found in the data.  On the other, 
numerous empirical papers try to test the most promising theories.  In turn, combining theoretical 
and empirical contributions has the potential to advance our understanding of various issues in 
internal labor markets in important ways. 
In this survey I focus on this two-way interaction between theory and empirical work.  In 
particular, I focused on two topics in the extensive literature on internal labor markets in order to 
both show the benefits of a rich interaction between theory and evidence and to draw some 
conclusions in each case concerning which theoretical approaches look most promising.  The 
first topic I considered is wage and promotion dynamics in internal labor markets.  Various 
distinct theoretical approaches have been put forth concerning this topic.  After reviewing the 
various theories and the relevant empirical literature, my conclusion is that a model that 
combines symmetric learning, human capital accumulation, and job assignment as in Gibbons 
and Waldman (1999,2006) has the most promise for explaining the various empirical findings.  
But other theoretical approaches such as tournament theory and asymmetric learning also seem 
important for a full understanding of what drives wage and promotion dynamics inside firms. 
                                                     
36 One exception may be between Japan and Germany.  Dertouzos, Lester, and Solow (1989) argue that even early 
on the operation of West Germany’s internal labor markets had similarities to those found in Japan that was not seen 
in most other industrialized countries. 
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The second literature I focused on is the literature concerning the growing use by firms of 
innovative work practices.  After reviewing the empirical and theoretical literatures, the clear 
conclusion is that, as argued by numerous authors including Milgrom and Roberts (1990,1995) 
and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), complementarity is a driving force for understanding the 
growing use of these practices.  The evidence is less clear concerning which of the various 
theories that have been put forth to explain the nature of these complementarities is most 
important.  But the argument that the driving force is a desire to move decision making from 
managers to lower level employees seems to be the argument that best matches the evidence. 
I also considered the literature on international differences concerning internal labor 
markets, where most of this literature focuses on US-Japanese differences.  One of the 
conclusions here is that at least some of the historical difference between the US and Japan likely 
stems from the later initial adoption of these practices in the US and slow diffusion.  However, 
some differences likely still remain even after taking account of the later initial adoption in the 
US and slow diffusion, and my sense is that the correct explanation for the remaining differences 
lies with different incentives for decentralized decision making across the two countries as 
emphasized, for example, recently by Morita (2001,2005) and earlier by Aoki (1986). 
I hope to have shown how a close partnership between theory and empirical evidence can 
be used to reach a deeper understanding of the driving forces behind internal-labor-market 
phenomena than can be reached by either empirical evidence or theory taken in isolation.  
Hopefully, future work concerning wage and promotion dynamics and the use of innovative-
human-resource practices, as well as research on other internal-labor-market topics, will 
continue to pursue the close two-way interaction between theory and empirical evidence 
described above.  
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